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In the aftermath of the Asian “financial crises,” a number of factors have
been identified as the culprits in leading to the crises and intensifying their
severity. Among them, so-called “crony capitalism,” the weakness of the
banking system precrisis, financial liberalization and opening of the capital
account, and the nominal exchange rate regime have all been singled out.
However, although all these factors obviously contributed, their relative
quantitative importance and the interactions between them are little un-
derstood. It is the purpose of this paper to delve, insofar as is feasible, into
the contributions of exchange rate depreciation, the weak financial system,
financial and capital account liberalization, and crony capitalism in leading
up to the crisis and intensifying its severity. For that purpose, we focus on
the Korean experience and trace the roles of the chaebol, the history of
credit rationing and buildup of domestic credit and foreign indebtedness
prior to the crisis, the opening of the capital account, and the impact of ex-
change rate depreciation on the crisis.
It is important to understand the role and relative importance of each of
the key variables. If, for example, exchange rate depreciation was forced as
the consequence of maintaining an unsustainable nominal exchange rate
for a long period of time prior to the crisis and was quantitatively the largest
factor in leading to the deterioration of the banks’ portfolios, resort in the
future to a genuinely floating exchange rate or preventing uncovered liabil-
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ities denominated in foreign exchange should greatly reduce the likelihood
of future crises. Likewise, if bank lending practices had resulted in a rapidly
increasing proportion of nonperforming loans (NPLs) in the banking sys-
tem even had the exchange rate not been a significant factor, the relative im-
portance of improving bank lending practices as a preventive measure for
future crises looms much larger.1 Moreover, if rigidities in the banking and
financial system resulting from failure to liberalize or regulate suﬃciently
were a major contributing factor, the policy lessons would focus on the ur-
gent need to liberalize and strengthen banking and financial systems in
emerging markets.
In our first section, we briefly sketch the roles that each of these factors
can play in theory in financial crises. In section 13.2 we then provide back-
ground on the Korean economy and the evolution of the banking and fi-
nancial systems, the chaebol, and linkages to the international economy,
which are essential building blocks for our later analysis. Section 13.3 then
examines the history of financing of the chaebol and their role in the Korean
economy. The fourth section then examines the financial structure and per-
formance of the chaebol and the banking system. The fifth section then con-
siders the role of foreign currency–denominated debt in intensifying the
crisis. The final section then provides our best judgment as to the relative
importance of the variables widely pointed to as contributing to crisis.
13.1 Domestic Credit Expansion, Lending to Chaebol or Cronies,
Exchange Rate Depreciation, Capital Account Opening, and Crises
As the title of this section suggests, the problem for analysis of the Asian
crises is not the lack of explanations: it is that there are too many. In those
crises, and in the Mexican crisis of 1994, a foreign exchange crisis and a fi-
nancial crisis occurred almost simultaneously and have come to be termed
twin crises. As will be seen, there are a number of reasons to anticipate that
these twin crises are likely to have a far more severe impact on a domestic
economy than either a financial or a currency crisis alone, and it is not co-
incidental that their onset is virtually simultaneous.
In this section, we briefly review the role of each of the possible causal
factors in precipitating and intensifying twin crises. Once that is done, fo-
cus turns to interactions between them. Thereafter, we attempt to assess
how important these factors were and the quantitative magnitude of the in-
teractions.
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1. In some countries, NPLs increase because of lending to the politically well connected,
who apparently do not expect, and are not expected, to repay. In Korea, however, the “crony-
ism” concerns surrounding bank lending focus on the lending by the banks to the large chae-
bol. Earlier lending to them had been sound, as will be seen, although as will also be seen, gov-
ernment oﬃcials supported lending to the chaebol by the banks when their profitability was
falling sharply in the precrisis period.
13.1.1 Exchange Rate Pegging
Although any nominal exchange rate could, in theory, be associated with
the appropriate real exchange rate,2 empirical evidence shows that govern-
mental policies with respect to nominal exchange rates over periods of three
to five years, if not longer, significantly aﬀect real exchange rates. Whether
this is because of long lags in adjustment or the unwillingness of the do-
mestic authorities to adopt the monetary and fiscal policies consistent with
their choice of nominal exchange rate is not relevant for present purposes.
Empirically, if the authorities intervene in the foreign exchange market for
purposes other than smoothing short-term fluctuations (such as maintain-
ing a fixed nominal exchange rate), the real exchange rate appreciates rela-
tive to major trading partners when domestic inflation exceeds the inflation
rate in the partner countries. Likewise, if for any reason (such as changes in
the terms of trade or rapid growth of domestic demand for imports) the real
exchange rate would adjust in a well-functioning free market but is pre-
vented from doing so, there can be imbalances between the demand for and
supply of foreign exchange. As long as the authorities can meet this de-
mand, buying or selling foreign exchange as demanded, they can maintain
their exchange rate policy.
All of the countries aﬄicted with twin crises in the 1990s had intervened
heavily in their foreign exchange market in one way or another to achieve
target nominal exchange rates. In the cases of Mexico and Thailand, the
nominal exchange rate had been either fixed, or adjusted according to a for-
mula that resulted in significant appreciation of the real exchange rate. In
Indonesia and Korea, terms-of-trade shocks probably called for a signifi-
cant real exchange rate depreciation at a time when there was some degree
of real appreciation—as will be seen below for Korea.
When government oﬃcials implicitly or explicitly indicate that they will
maintain an exchange rate policy that results in an appreciating currency in
real terms, they provide individuals and firms with a strong incentive to ac-
cess the international capital market, because the real interest rate is typi-
cally lower than in the domestic market.3 When domestic residents have ac-
cess to the foreign capital market, or when domestic banks can borrow
abroad, the result is an increase in the nation’s liabilities, and exchange rate
policy means that the government is increasing its contingent liabilities. The
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2. This would require that the domestic authorities refrain from using monetary and fiscal
policies in pursuit of domestic economic objectives and instead allow inflation or deflation to
occur as the “equilibrium” real exchange rate changed. Thus, if from an initial position of bal-
ance the terms of trade deteriorated and warranted a real depreciation of the currency, the do-
mestic price level would have to be allowed to decline to achieve that real depreciation.
3. Lowering the domestic nominal interest rate would result in more domestic inflation and
is thus eschewed by the authorities. See Krueger (1997) for the calculation of Mexican real in-
terest rates during the precrisis period when a nominal anchor exchange rate policy was fol-
lowed.
unsustainability of the nominal exchange rate policy results in a buildup of
domestic credit and foreign liabilities until the time when either domestic res-
idents and foreigners anticipate that the exchange rate will alter and attempt
to get out of domestic money and into foreign currency or the public or
private debt-servicing obligations denominated in foreign exchange are not
voluntarily met. At that point, either the run on the currency results in a cur-
rency crisis, or the prospective inability to continue voluntary debt-servicing
forces the same outcome. Resolving the crisis almost always involves an al-
teration in the exchange rate, and usually in exchange rate policy.4
It should be noted here that there can be a “pure” currency crisis, one that
exists without a financial crisis. The normal precondition for this outcome
is a reasonably sound banking and financial system at the time of the onset
of the currency crisis, or a preexisting highly restrictive set of capital con-
trols that prevented the buildup of significant foreign indebtedness. Brazil’s
devaluation in 1999 is one good example of a currency crisis in which there
was no serious domestic financial spillover.
13.1.2 Crony Capitalism and Crisis
If there is a continuing buildup of NPLs in the banking system, a finan-
cial crisis will result unless eﬀective measures are taken to reverse the
buildup. NPLs can come about for several reasons: (a) there can be an un-
foreseen macroeconomic disturbance (originating abroad or domestically)
that leads to unfavorable outcomes for borrowers; (b) domestic credit ex-
pansion may be so rapid that banks are unwilling or unable to exercise nor-
mal prudence in lending, and a disproportionate number of borrowers are
unable to service their debts (often after a macroeconomic downturn); (c)
banks may be directed or induced to lend to politically well-connected
cronies, who do not service their outstanding loans; and, finally, (d) banks
may lend to favored (economically important) enterprises that do not or
cannot service their debt obligations. This last case includes the circum-
stance in which banks provide “evergreen” accounts for large businesses
that are indebted to them, rolling over existing debt and extending credit to
finance interest payments on it.
For Indonesia, it is thought that the third explanation—obligatory lend-
ing to politically well-connected friends and relatives of the president—was
a significant factor in the NPLs of the banking system. In Thailand (and
to a degree in Korea, as will be seen below), rapid expansion of domestic
credit, certainly at least somewhat associated with the fixed nominal ex-
change rate, was a major culprit. In Japan in the late 1980s, where currency
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4. It should be noted that not all exchange rate changes will immediately quell the crisis. In
the Mexican case, there was already a significant capital outflow when the authorities an-
nounced a nominal devaluation. In the view of most market participants, the magnitude of the
announced devaluation was too small, and the run on the currency intensified. It was not un-
til the exchange rate was permitted to float that the immediate crisis subsided.
crisis was not a factor, a large negative macroeconomic shock when the
rapid inflation of asset prices was reversed was the trigger for diﬃculties in
the banking system. Probably the best example of the last explanation, lend-
ing to favored enterprises and evergreening their accounts, is the Korean
case, to be discussed below.
Here, the important point is that once NPLs become significant in a
bank’s portfolios, serious diﬃculties are likely to result in the absence of
suﬃcient provisioning or capital. A bank with sizable NPLs must charge
higher interest rates on its lending in order to cover its costs over a smaller
proportion of its business. Consequently, if it has more NPLs than its com-
petitors, only those unable to obtain cheaper credit at banks with healthier
balance sheets will borrow from it, thus increasing the riskiness of its port-
folio. At the same time, as depositors learn of the bank’s diﬃculties, they are
likely to attempt to withdraw their deposits.
When many domestic banks have these diﬃculties at the same time, do-
mestic credit can contract sharply. If there are foreign competitors (or if
creditworthy borrowers can borrow abroad), the entire domestic banking
system can be threatened.
13.1.3 Domestic Credit Expansion
Domestic credit can expand unduly rapidly because of government di-
rection of credit to cronies or to favored enterprises. However, it can also ex-
pand rapidly because of the incentives provided by the exchange rate regime
or simply because government monetary and fiscal policy is very loose for
whatever reason. Rapid expansion of credit is dangerous. On one hand, it
is inflationary, which means that for a while a permissive environment will
enable borrowers to service their debts until tighter monetary policy is
adopted to curb the resulting inflation. On the other hand, accelerated lend-
ing is associated with a deteriorating quality of borrower, both because
there are simply not enough sound borrowers to finance such a rapid ex-
pansion and because banks do not have the capacity to evaluate lending at
such an increasing rate.
Rapid expansion of domestic credit was a feature of the precrisis period
in Mexico, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Korea. In the Indonesian
case, the expansion of domestic credit exceeded 20 percent of gross domes-
tic product (GDP) in the precrisis years.
13.1.4 Capital Account Liberalization
Many observers have blamed the opening of the capital account for the
twin crises of the 1990s. The simple argument goes that without an open
capital account, indebtedness could not have built up. However, there have
been many experiences with foreign exchange crises in countries where the
capital account was relatively closed. The degree to which cross-border fi-
nancial flows must be regulated to prevent speculative flows when exchange
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rates are greatly misaligned is more restrictive than is compatible with a rel-
atively open trading regime.
Moreover, many countries with open capital accounts have not experi-
enced the diﬃculties that the Asian countries did. Economies such as those
of Taiwan and Singapore, where there were current account surpluses and
high levels of foreign exchange reserves relative to trade volumes, did not ex-
perience diﬃculties.
To the extent that the opening of the capital account results in diﬃculties,
there are more complex avenues than those associated with real apprecia-
tion of the currency. First, when the capital account is open and the nomi-
nal exchange rate is fixed without appropriate supportive monetary and fis-
cal policies, as discussed above, there are strong incentives for banks or
private entities to incur foreign exchange–denominated liabilities (capital
inflow) because of lower borrowing costs. When they view the government
as having guaranteed the exchange rate, they may not match their future
foreign exchange liabilities with foreign exchange assets. Second, banks
may not have suﬃcient incentives for appropriate prudence in their lending
policies, due either to a lack of capital adequacy (and existing NPLs) or to
an absence of appropriate supervision.
In the first case, it would appear that the exchange rate regime is the real
culprit; in the second, it is weaknesses in the domestic financial system,
which become exacerbated with the opening of the capital account.
13.2 The Korean Economy, the Chaebol, Credit Rationing, and Growth
13.2.1 Korean Economic Growth After 1960
As is well known, Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world in
the late 1950s and was then widely regarded as a country without serious
growth prospects. After economic policy reforms began in the early 1960s,
Korea began growing at sustained rates previously unheard of in world his-
tory.5 Real GDP grew at an average annual rate of 10 percent per annum in
the decade starting in 1963. High growth rates continued into the 1990s, and
Korea’s real per capita income in the mid-1990s was nearly nine times what
it had been in the early 1960s (see fig. 13.1).
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5. Taiwan’s rate of economic growth was equally rapid. Prior to the crisis of the late 1990s,
most observers would have claimed that the major diﬀerence between the Taiwanese and Ko-
rean economies was the relatively small scale of Taiwanese enterprises contrasted with the
large share of the Korean chaebol in the Korean economy. However, there were other diﬀer-
ences: perhaps because of greater strategic insecurity, the Taiwanese held very large foreign ex-
change reserves in relation to the size of their trade or their economy; the Taiwanese dollar
showed no tendency for real appreciation; and Taiwan’s current account had been consistently
in surplus. The Taiwanese financial system appears to have been considerably sounder than
that of Korea in the late 1990s, and the rate of expansion of domestic credit at that time was
much lower than that in Korea.
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Economic liberalization took place throughout the first thirty-five years
of Korea’s rapid growth. In 1960, the country had had the usual developing-
country mix of an overvalued exchange rate supported by quantitative re-
strictions on imports (and a black market in foreign exchange), consequent
high walls of protection for domestic manufacturers, price controls on
many key commodities, credit rationing, a large fiscal deficit, one of the
highest rates of inflation in the world, and a huge (averaging around 9 per-
cent of GDP over the period 1953–58) current account deficit, financed
largely by foreign aid inflows.6
First steps in reform included a move to a more realistic (and constant
real) exchange rate for exports and the relaxation of restrictions on import-
ing by exporters. Imports were liberalized further in the late 1960s, and the
exchange regime was unified by that time. Other major reforms also took
place, including a major fiscal and tax reform in 1964, gradual removal of
price controls, a shift from a regime discriminating against agriculture to a
protective one, and further liberalization of the trade regime. In the later
1960s, quantitative restrictions on imports were greatly eased and tariﬀs
were lowered in several steps, and further trade liberalization took place in
the 1990s.
In the early years of rapid growth, however, the banking system remained
tightly controlled. Even after a reform in 1965 (which resulted in a positive
real rate of interest for borrowers), credit was rationed and the curb market
rate was well above the controlled interest rate (see Hong 1981). Only in the
late 1980s did deregulation of interest rates begin, although the apparent
gap between demand and supply of loanable funds was declining over time
(see section 13.3).
When economic policy reform began, Korea’s exports were only about 3
percent of GDP, whereas imports were about 13 percent. Policy makers
therefore began to focus on measures to increase exports. They did so by en-
couraging all exports uniformly,7 but nonetheless they held something that
might be regarded as approaching an “export theory of value.” Any firm
that could export was rewarded in proportion to the foreign exchange re-
ceipts from exporting. Moreover, many of the firms that were initially suc-
cessful were chaebol (although they were very small at the time, and some
Korean analysts today do not regard the Hyundais, Samsungs, and the like
of the 1960s as chaebol at all). Because they were successful, they grew rap-
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6. See Krueger (1979) and Frank, Kim, and Westphal (1975) for an account of the early pe-
riod of Korea’s rapid development.
7. All exporters were given an “export subsidy,” an “interest subsidy,” and a tax subsidy, each
of a specified number of won per dollar of exports (the number being altered from time to time
as conditions were deemed to warrant). In addition, exporters were permitted to import goods
for their use in generous quantities, which undoubtedly permitted some profits through use of
the excess for domestic sales. To a significant degree, these “incentives” oﬀset the duties and
other charges on imports and resulted in reasonably uniform incentives for import competing
and exportable production.
idly. They received new loans as their exports grew and as they expanded
into new exporting activities.8 Given the underdeveloped state of the Ko-
rean financial markets at that time (and in the absence of measures to
strengthen them), access to credit was vital for expansion.
The chaebol were successful exporters and, for the first decade or more of
Korean growth, were regarded almost as the heroes of Korean develop-
ment. They were rewarded for export performance and were highly prof-
itable. Hong (1981) estimates the real rate of return on capital to have been
about 35 percent or more in the first decade following the start of reforms.
Although the chaebol were highly profitable and generally encouraged to
enter whatever export markets they could, when the authorities wanted a
venture undertaken, the chaebol were asked to do so. They undertook these
ventures with the implicit guarantee of the government that credit, tax ex-
emptions, and other support would be available to make the venture prof-
itable.9 However, the chaebol were on the whole remarkably profitable and
had little diﬃculty in servicing their (subsidized) debt.
The extent to which the Korean economy changed structure is remark-
able (see fig. 13.2). Exports and export earnings (the dollar price index of
traded goods being stable in the 1960s) grew at over 41 percent annually for
the period 1959–69 and continued growing almost that rapidly thereafter.
Exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP rose from 3 percent
in 1960 to 14 percent in 1970 and to 33 percent in 1980; imports also rose,
from their 10 percent level in 1960 to 41 percent of GDP in 1980. Hence, the
Korean economy was becoming much more open.10
At the start of reforms, rationed credit financed a large fraction of new
investment, especially in the manufacturing sector. The subsidies implicit in
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8. Some of these activities were chosen by the chaebol. On occasion, however, the authori-
ties suggested to chaebol owners that they should move into certain lines of production. This
attempt to “pick winners” was not always successful; when it reached its height in the heavy
and chemical industry (HCI) drive of the mid-1970s, the rate of economic growth and of ex-
port expansion slowed substantially, and policies were reversed by the late 1970s. When chae-
bol incurred losses while undertaking these mandated activities, the banks were directed to ex-
tend additional credit to the chaebol, thus setting a precedent for later diﬃculties.
9. It is important to underscore that these government “rewards” existed in the context of
the export drive. When chaebol could not produce competitive exports, there was little support.
Even in the HCI drive—the most industry-specific interventionist phase of Korean policy—
the output from HCI industries was to be exported within a specified period. When it became
clear that that performance test was not being passed, the entire thrust of policy was reevalu-
ated.
10. Some of the increase in imports was of course intermediate goods used in the production
of exportables. However, the percentage import content of exports remained fairly stable at
around 35 percent of the value of exports over the period of rapid growth. From 1960 onward,
exporters were entitled to import with little paperwork virtually anything that they might use
in producing exportables; in addition, they were permitted to import a “wastage” allowance,
which they were free to sell on the domestic market. Thus, the de facto liberalization exceeded
that which took place because of the removal of quantitative restrictions and lowering of
tariﬀs. With an average tariﬀ rate in the tariﬀ schedule of around 15 percent in 1970, average
tariﬀ collections as a percent of imports were about 6 percent.
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this credit served as a stimulus to industry and permitted much more rapid
expansion than would have been possible had companies been forced to
rely on reinvesting their own profits.11 Exporters were allocated preferential
credit based upon their export performance. The real rate of return was so
high that all the chaebol would happily have borrowed more had they been
able to; most of them, as reported by Hong (1981), borrowed additional
funds at the much higher curb market rates. Thus, lending at controlled in-
terest rates was, at least in the early years, equivalent to an intramarginal
subsidy to the chaebol.
Estimates of rates of return suggest that the chaebol were highly profitable
at that time even without subsidies. Indeed, given the huge distortions in the
economy that prevailed in the late 1950s, it is likely that, at least in the 1960s,
almost any reasonably sensible venture into unskilled labor–intensive ex-
portable production had a high real rate of return.
As already mentioned, by the mid-1960s the borrowing rate from the
banks was positive in real terms although below a market-clearing rate.
Over the following three decades, the banking system was further liberal-
ized as the real interest rate charged for loans rose and the gap between the
controlled rate and what might have cleared the market diminished (see sec-
tion 13.3). At the same time, the real rate of return on investments naturally
fell, because the very high initial returns obviously could not be sustained.
We trace the decline in real returns and the increase in the real cost of credit
in the next section.
When policy reforms began in the early 1960s, the Korean saving rate was
very low, even negative by some estimates. As growth accelerated and per
capita incomes rose, domestic saving began to increase rapidly, rising from
around zero percent of GDP12 in 1960 to 18 percent by 1970 and to 24 per-
cent by 1980 (see fig. 13.1). However, at least until the late 1970s, profitable
investment opportunities greatly exceeded domestic saving. As a result, do-
mestic saving was supplemented by borrowing from abroad, equaling as
much as 13 percent of GDP in years in the late 1960s.13 Despite the large
capital inflows, however, the ratios of debt service to exports and debt to
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11. In much of the public discussion about the reliance of firms in crisis countries on bor-
rowing, what seems to be forgotten is that, starting from very low levels of income and devel-
opment, there is very little equity, and a large fraction of investment must therefore be financed
through other channels.
12. In 1960, it is estimated that private saving was a positive 3.2 percent of GDP, whereas
government saving was a negative 2 percent of GDP. Foreign sources financed 78 percent of
investment, which was 10 percent of GDP. See Krueger (1979, 206–07). In 1960, most foreign
resources were foreign aid. 
13. Most of the capital inflow was from the private sector—largely commercial bank lend-
ing—by the late 1960s. Foreign aid had peaked in 1958 and was less than 2 percent of GDP by
the mid-1960s. The current account deficit was sustainable because of the profitability of in-
vestment and the declining debt-service ratio that resulted from such rapid growth of exports
and of real GDP.
GDP did not increase because of the rapid rate of growth of export earn-
ings and real GDP.
The Korean government guaranteed these credits and determined the
maximum that could be borrowed, allocating borrowing rights among ex-
porting firms. Because the foreign interest rate was well below the domestic
interest rate (especially in the curb market) and the real exchange rate was
fairly stable for exporters, there was intense competition for foreign loans.
As domestic saving rose, the proportionate reliance on foreign resources
to supplement domestic saving in financing investment fell. By the 1980s,
the domestic saving rate was in excess of 30 percent, and the current ac-
count went into surplus for several years in the mid-1980s.14 Beginning at
this time, the American government in bilateral trade negotiations began to
pressure the Koreans to allow the won to appreciate in order to reduce the
bilateral trade surplus with the United States.15 By the mid-1990s most Ko-
rean economists believed that some real depreciation of the won would be
in Korea’s best interest but the pressures against such a move prevented it.
Although the won exchange rate was not fixed, the range within which it
fluctuated was relatively narrow: it appreciated from 890 won per dollar at
the end of 1985 to 679 won per dollar in 1989, and thereafter it gradually
depreciated to 808 won per dollar in 1993, appreciating again to 788 won
per dollar in 1995. At the end of 1996 it stood at 844 won per dollar, and of
course it depreciated almost 50 percent in 1997.16 For the decade prior to
the 1997 crisis, however, there had been little change in the real exchange
rate.
Thus, by the mid-1990s, Korea had sustained three and a half decades of
rapid growth. Although there had been periods of diﬃculty—both slow-
downs and overheating—Korean policy makers had met their challenges
successfully. As noted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), the country had progressed from being one of the
poorest developing countries in 1960 to having a per capita income equal to
that of some OECD countries and a higher rate of economic growth.17
The late 1980s had witnessed the introduction of a democratic process
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14. Korean policy makers viewed the emergence of the current account surplus as a transi-
tory phenomenon explicable by “three lows”: the fall in oil prices in the mid-1980s, the drop in
world interest rates (so that debt-servicing costs declined), and the low dollar (or high yen).
The current account turned positive in 1986, rose to a peak of 8.5 percent of GDP in 1988, fell
to 2.4 percent of GDP in 1989, turned negative (-0.5 percent) in 1990, and remained negative
in the 1–2 percent range until 1997, when the deficit increased to 4.7 percent of GDP.
15. Korea was running a bilateral surplus with the United States and a bilateral deficit with
Japan, and policy makers resisted as far as they could these pressures. One response was to ask
the American authorities whether they should devalue with respect to the yen while they ap-
preciated with respect to the U.S. dollar!
16. Exchange rates, saving rates, and current account deficit data are all taken from various
issues of the IMF’s International Financial Statistics unless otherwise noted.
17. For an account of the Korean economy in the mid-1990s reflecting this consensus view,
see OECD (1994).
into Korea. The elected governments chose to liberalize further, especially
in the financial sector and international capital flows.18 In 1992–93 there
was a “growth recession,” as the growth rate slowed to just over 5 percent
(in contrast with rates over 9 percent in the preceding two years and an av-
erage rate above 8 percent in the preceding decade). One response was to
ease monetary policy: domestic credit expanded by over 18 percent in 1994,
14 percent in 1995, and 21 percent in 1996.19 Real GDP growth responded,
exceeding 8 percent in 1994 and 1995. However, as will be argued in section
13.3, underlying weaknesses were not addressed, and the stimulus to the
economy, through expansion of domestic credit and other measures, in-
creased the vulnerability of the financial system later on.
13.2.2 The Crisis
Export earnings failed to maintain their growth rate in 1996, increasing
only 3 percent in dollar terms, as falling prices for semiconductors and
a number of other factors resulted in the slowdown. Then, early in 1997, a
number of events took place that surely eroded confidence. One of the large
chaebol, Hanbo, went bankrupt early in the year. Given that the large chae-
bol were widely believed to be “too big to fail,” this in and of itself must have
resulted in some loss of confidence and a reexamination of Korea’s credit-
worthiness. Moreover, 1997 was an election year, with the presidential elec-
tions scheduled for early in December. That the market anticipated diﬃ-
culties is reflected in the fact that the Korean stock exchange index fell from
981 in April 1996 to 677 by the end of March 1997 and to 471 at the end of
October, even before the outbreak of the currency crisis.
However, although the net and gross foreign (and especially short-term)
liabilities of the banking and financial systems were continuing to increase,
there was no visible evidence of crisis until the final quarter of the year. The
Thai crisis had exploded in June, and the Indonesian crisis had begun dur-
ing the summer of 1997, but most foreign observers were confident, given
Korea’s past history, that Korea would not be aﬀected.20 Korea’s oﬀshore
banks were holding paper from Indonesia, Russia, and other countries with
dollar liabilities, which would further deteriorate the net foreign asset posi-
tion, but that was not widely known at the time.
However, capital flight began early in the fourth quarter of the year. In
many instances, it was simply due to a refusal to roll over short-term debt,
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18. See the OECD (1994) description of the five-year financial liberalization plan.
19. This rate was not markedly faster, however, than it had been over the entire preceding
decade. Hahm and Mishkin (2000, 91) reject the notion that liberalization of the capital ac-
count was responsible for the increase in domestic credit, but note that it did play a role in per-
mitting the banks to take on greater exposures to foreign exchange risk.
20. However, many Korean economists and policy analysts were very concerned. Krueger
was at a conference of Korean economic policy makers in August 1997, and the mood was one
of deep gloom. Many of the participants were extremely pessimistic about the chaebol, the
state of the financial system, and the potential for reforms of economic policy. 
but other factors contributed: Korea’s sovereign risk status was down-
graded by Standard & Poor’s in October; reported NPLs in the banking sys-
tem doubled between the end of 1996 and the fourth quarter of 1998, reach-
ing 7.5 percent of total loans by that time, owing largely to the bankruptcy
of six chaebol and the sharp drop in the Korean stock exchange. However,
once it became known that reserves were decreasing, others sought to get
out of won, and the capital outflow intensified rapidly.21 Total reserves less
overseas branch deposits and other unusable foreign exchange were $22.3
billion at the end of October and fell to $7.3 billion by the end of Novem-
ber.22 It is reported that, by the time the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) was approached, gross reserves were being depleted at a rate so rapid
that they would have approached zero within forty-eight hours. In the pro-
gram presented to the IMF board, it was reported that usable reserves had
dropped from $22.5 billion on 31 October to $13 billion on 21 November
and to $6 billion on 2 December.23
13.2.3 The IMF Program24
All three presidential candidates had declared repeatedly that under no
circumstances would they approach the IMF. When the government did ap-
proach the IMF, the IMF’s problem was complicated by several things: (a)
it was not known who the new president would be, and hence with whom
the IMF would have to deal on the economics team; (b) there was very little
time to put together a program, and both because Korea had been viewed
as “sound” until recently and because the candidates had all said they
would not approach the Fund, there had been less preliminary work done
than was usually the case;25 (c) the exchange rate was depreciating sharply
after the end of October, and when the band was widened to 10 percent on
19 November, the rate of depreciation began to accelerate rapidly; and (d)
as has already been mentioned, the government was rapidly running out of
foreign exchange reserves, and would soon be forced to default on its obli-
gations (see Boughton 2000). The high short-term indebtedness meant that
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21. However, even in November, the Finance Ministry was issuing reassuring statements,
and private forecasters were minimizing the likelihood that Korea would approach the IMF.
For a representative account, see John Burton’s “Korean Currency Slide Shakes Economy” in
the Financial Times, 12 November 1997, 5.
22. Data are from Hahm and Mishkin (2000, table 11).
23. Other factors also contributed. A financial reform bill, proposed by a blue ribbon com-
mittee, had been turned down by parliament, and it was not clear whether the government had
legally guaranteed the foreign exchange liabilities of the financial institutions. Although inter-
est rates had risen by about 200 basis points, the Bank of Korea was nonetheless injecting liq-
uidity into the system, which reversed the increase.
24. The IMF documents cited in this section may be found at [http://www.imf.org/
external/country/KOR/index.htm]. 
25. The fact that the Thai and Indonesian crises had already occurred no doubt diverted
some of the attention that Korea otherwise might have received. At that time, too, it must have
been anticipated that there would be Malaysian and Philippine programs.
foreigners could get out of won simply by refusing to roll over outstanding
debt.26
The first (hastily assembled) program set forth the following as its objec-
tives: “building the conditions for an early return of confidence so as to limit
the deceleration of real GDP growth to about 3 percent of GDP in 1998, fol-
lowed by a recovery towards potential in 1999; containing inflation at or be-
low 5 percent; and building international reserves to more than two months
of imports by end-1998.”27 The staﬀ memorandum stated that there were
three pillars in the government’s program: the macroeconomic frame-
work,28 the restructuring and recapitalizing of the financial sector, and a re-
duction in the reliance of corporations and financial institutions on short-
term debt.
For present purposes, the specifics of the IMF program are not relevant.
However, understanding those aspects of the program that were important
in aﬀecting the severity of the downturn is necessary if an assessment of the
role of the various factors leading in the downturn is to be made. In at-
tempting to stem the speculative pressures, the exchange rate was allowed to
float, and the won depreciated from the mid-800s level per dollar to almost
1,800 per U.S. dollar.29 The liquidity that had been introduced into the fi-
nancial system in prior weeks (in an eﬀort to support the chaebol ) was re-
moved, and money market rates were raised sharply. In the words of the IMF
staﬀ, these rates would “be maintained at as high a level as needed to stabi-
lize markets” (5). Day-to-day monetary policy was to be geared to exchange
rate and short-term interest rate movements, whereas exchange rate policy
was to be flexible, with intervention “limited to smoothing operations.”
The 1998 budget as passed by the government had projected a surplus of
about 0.25 percent of GDP. However, the IMF staﬀ estimated that lower
growth and the altered exchange rate would reduce the balance by 0.8 per-
cent of GDP and that it would require 5.5 percent of GDP to recapitalize
the banks to meet the Basel minimum capital standards. It was assumed
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26. Hahm and Mishkin (2000) point out that “the speculative attack was not in the usual
form of direct currency attack to exploit expected depreciation. Due to the tight regulation on
currency forwards which should be backed by corresponding current account transactions and
the absence of currency futures markets inside Korea at the time, opportunities for direct spec-
ulative attack had been much limited. Rather, the drastic depreciation of Korean won was
driven by foreign creditors’ run on Korean financial institutions and chaebols to collect their
loans, and by foreign investors to exit from the Korean stock market” (25).
27. IMF, Korea, “Request for Standby,” 3 December 1997, 5. 
28. Much of the controversy surrounding the Korean program centers on whether the pro-
gram tightened fiscal policy too much. This is discussed below. It should be noted that the
Fund staﬀ’s introduction of the macroeconomic program indicated that the program would in-
volve “a tighter monetary stance and significant fiscal adjustment” (5).
29. As stated in the “Request for Standby,” “The inflation target reflects a very limited pass-
through of the recent depreciation of the won to the aggregate price level.... In order to achieve
the inflation objective, the government will aim to reduce broad money growth (M3) from an
estimated 16.4 percent at end-September to 15.4 percent at end-December 1997, and to a rate
consistent with the inflation objective in 1998” (5–6).
that these funds would have to be borrowed, and interest costs (0.8 percent
of GDP) were therefore also included in the altered budget estimates. Ac-
cording to fund estimates, these factors would have shifted the fiscal ac-
count into deficit of about 1.5 percent of GDP in 1998. As stated by staﬀ,
“In order to prevent such a deficit and alleviate the burden on monetary
policy in the overall macroeconomic adjustment, fiscal policy will be tight-
ened to achieve at least balance and, preferably, a small surplus.” The pro-
gram therefore called for fiscal changes approximately oﬀsetting the nega-
tive anticipated changes and thus for maintenance of the fiscal stance as
anticipated prior to the crisis, with the 1.5 percent of GDP cuts equally dis-
tributed between government expenditures and revenues. The government
initially raised some taxes to yield about 0.5 percent of GDP.
The second leg of the program was financial restructuring. As already in-
dicated, NPLs were large and increasing prior to the crisis. The deprecia-
tion of the exchange rate increased debt-servicing obligations for chaebol
and financial institutions, as did the increase in interest rates that came
about with monetary tightening. An exit policy was to be adopted to close
down weak financial institutions, and the remaining banks were to be re-
capitalized (through mergers or other means). A deposit guarantee was to
be phased out at the end of December 2000 and replaced with deposit in-
surance for small depositors only.30
Bank restructuring required a prior, or at least concurrent, restructuring
of the chaebol finances. Given their very high debt-equity ratios (for one
chaebol at the height of the crisis, the debt-equity ratio reached 12:1),31 fi-
nancial viability, where feasible at all, would surely require swaps of debt by
the chaebol to the banks, giving the banks equity in return. For this reason,
it was predictable that the restructuring would require time. Data on the fi-
nances of the chaebol are given in section 13.3. The standby also addressed
corporate governance and corporate financial structure issues, focusing on
improving incentives and supervision for banking operations and reform-
ing bankruptcy laws. The government also agreed to refrain from providing
financial support, providing tax privileges, or forcing mergers for individ-
ual companies.
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30. There were a number of other significant measures, which are less important for present
purposes. For example, transparency was to be increased in a variety of ways. Large firms were
to be audited by international accounting houses. Supervisory functions were to be reorgan-
ized, and the Bank of Korea was given much greater independence. Importantly, the govern-
ment undertook to refrain from attempting to influence lending decisions, leaving those to the
financial institutions. However, these actions had little impact on the short-run downturn.
31. These high debt-equity ratios were public knowledge. The Financial Times published
data on debt-equity ratios for twenty chaebol on 8 August 1997. The highest was Sammi, with
33.3 times as much debt as equity; Jinro had 85.0 times as much debt as equity and Halla 20.0
times; Hyundai’s debt was 4.4 times its equity, and so on. Profits were relatively small as a per-
centage of assets or sales. In Samsung’s case, for example, net profits were 179.5 billion won on
sales of 60 trillion won and total assets of 51 trillion won. Nine of the twenty chaebol listed in
the Financial Times on that day had taken losses.
A final issue of concern here is the projected magnitude of the financial
support for the Korean program. The current account deficit was expected
to decline markedly in 1997 to about 3 percent of GDP, and then—with ex-
port growth and won depreciation—to about 0.5 percent of GDP in 1998.
However, the very high level of short-term debt was considered worrisome.
As stated in the “Request for Standby”:
It is diﬃcult to estimate with any certainty the likely developments in cap-
ital flows . . . , given the uncertainty surrounding the rolling over of
private sector short-term debt and the recent collapse in market confi-
dence. . . . The working assumption is that, on the basis of the beneficial
eﬀects on market confidence of the announced program and the large fi-
nancing package, the bulk of the short-term debt will be rolled over. Un-
der this scenario, the purpose of the exceptional financing would be
largely to reconstitute reserves. For this outcome to materialize, it is crit-
ical that the financing package provided is adequately large and the pro-
gram is perceived to be strong. It is anticipated that a comprehensive fi-
nancing package of about $55 billion will be provided on a multilateral
and bilateral basis. (12)
13.2.4 The Severity of the Crisis
For at least two weeks after the announcement of the IMF program,
questions remained as to whether the downward slide had been halted.32
By late December, however, the exchange rate had stabilized, and by mid-
January, foreign banks announced a $24 billion package of rollovers and
new money.33
Domestic economic activity slowed markedly in 1998. For the year as a
whole, real GDP fell by 6.7 percent, contrasted with the IMF’s fund’s pro-
jected 3 percent. The unemployment rate, which had been 2.2 percent at the
end of the third quarter of 1997, rose throughout 1998 and peaked in the
first quarter of 1999 at 8.4 percent. The seasonally adjusted industrial pro-
duction index fell by 15 percent from the end of 1997 to the second quarter
of 1998. Thereafter it rose, reaching its precrisis level by the end of 1998 and
144.9 at the end of 1999.
The external accounts improved markedly. There was a sharp drop in im-
ports in immediate response to the crisis and a much-increased current ac-
count balance: Although exports were slightly lower in dollar terms in 1998
than in 1997, imports fell 22.4 percent, and the current account balance was
equal to an astonishing 12.5 percent of GDP for the year. Foreign exchange
reserves rose in response, reaching $74 billion by the end of 1999 and $83.6
billion by the end of the first quarter of 2000. The decline in real GDP ended
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32. Because of this, it is very diﬃcult to accept the argument that the Fund program was “too
stringent.” Indeed, given those uncertainties, it is more plausible to argue that the program
might have been even more restrictive initially. 
33. Financial Times, 30 January 1998, ll. 
in mid-1998, and by the end of the year real GDP had exceeded its precrisis
level. For 1999, real GDP growth exceeded 9 percent and was projected to
attain the same rate for 2000.
After early 1998, the nominal exchange rate appreciated in dollar terms,
entering the year 2000 at around 1,100 won to the dollar, contrasted with
1,800 to the dollar at the peak of the crisis. Moreover, prices at the end of
1998 were about 7 percent higher than at the end of 1997; in 1999 the rate
of inflation was just 0.8 percent, as measured by the consumer price index.
Progress in restructuring the financial sector was necessarily consider-
ably slower. Although interest rates had fallen below their precrisis levels by
the end of 1999, restructuring of chaebol and financial institutions met with
considerable resistance.34 Government policy pronouncements and actions
have continued to push for reforms, but the pace of reform has been much
slower than that of the balance of payments and external finances.
However, by any measure, the negative impact of the crisis and the mea-
sures addressing it was felt most heavily in 1998. By early 2000, the Korean
recovery was more rapid and more pronounced than had been anticipated
by any.35
13.3 Estimating the Role of Financial and 
Other Variables in Leading to Crisis
Financial restructuring was absolutely essential—first to make the re-
forms credible (or capital outflows would have continued) and second as a
prerequisite for economic recovery. Additionally, because the devaluation
and higher interest rates would both weaken the financial sector in the short
run (and this was understood by the markets), failure to address the issue of
financial restructuring would clearly have increased the severity of the re-
cession and delayed, if not aborted, the recovery. Moreover, financial re-
structuring could not be satisfactorily undertaken without addressing the
very high debt-equity ratios of the chaebol. How much this intensified the
downturn, however, cannot be addressed until consideration of the finances
of the chaebol and the financial system are considered.
Either a financial crisis or a currency crisis must be addressed with mea-
sures that will cause economic pain in the short run. However, when the two
interact, the resulting costs are much higher. To see how this scenario played
out in Korea, we begin with an examination of the finances of the chaebol
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34. See, for example, John Burton’s “Boxed into a Corner” in the Financial Times, 23 No-
vember 1998, l7, whose first sentence read, “South Korea’s chaebol are fighting a stiﬀ rear-
guard action against government reforms but the conglomerates are being forced to change
their ways.”
35. This is not to say that corporate and financial restructuring had been completed. At the
time of this writing (late 2000), unprofitable chaebol activities, including some large entities, are
still being closed down, with attendant concerns about a slowing of the rate of growth in 2001.
prior to late 1997. An overview of their evolution and the problems that de-
veloped will be useful before we turn to details. As mentioned earlier, the
chaebol had earlier contributed enormously to Korea’s rapid economic
growth. By the early 1990s, the largest thirty chaebol accounted for 49 per-
cent of assets and 42 percent of sales in the manufacturing sector. Although
they had received subsidized credit, this implicit subsidy was probably
mostly intramarginal in the 1960s and 1970s and probably simply increased
overall profitability and reinvestment rates. However, over time, the prof-
itability of the chaebol necessarily diminished, while the real interest rate at
which they borrowed was increasing.
Table 13.1 gives data on lending rates of deposit money banks from 1961
to 1987, the period during which interest rates were controlled. In 1987, the
quantity of regulated loans was sharply reduced, and the Bank of Korea
stopped reporting the interest rates by those loan categories separately. To
estimate how much of a subsidy was involved in deposit money banks
(DMBs) lending, it is necessary to contrast that rate with an estimate of
what a market-clearing real interest rate might have been.36 To that end,
table 13.2 gives the curb market interest rates, the inflation rates, and the
growth rates over the years from 1961 to 1998. We then construct an esti-
mate of what a realistic real borrowing rate might have been by adding the
inflation rate to the growth rate and calculating a three-year moving aver-
age.
Table 13.3 then gives the DMB loans enjoying preferential interest rates
by type of loan. The last column gives these loans as a percentage of the to-
tal. As can be seen, they peaked in the late 1970s (which coincided with the
so-called heavy chemical and industry [HCI] drive), but were sizable during
the 1980s as well. Only in the 1990s after interest rate liberalization did their
share drop to less than 5 percent of outstanding loans.
We then derive estimates of the subsidy through DMB loans in the first
column of table 13.4. The estimates are made by multiplying the volume of
DMB loans by the diﬀerence between the reference interest rate and the ac-
tual borrowing rate. Also shown in table 13.4 are similarly derived estimates
of the subsidy through loans to the manufacturing sector from the Korea
Development Bank, a nonbank financial institution that lent for investment
in public utilities, infrastructure, equipment for manufacturing, and other
purchases deemed desirable for developmental purposes. The sum of these
estimates should be compared with the final column of table 13.4, which
gives the estimates of all manufacturing firms’ ordinary incomes (that re-
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36. The curb market rate, given in column (1) of table 13.4, provides an alternate “reference
interest rate.” As can be seen, the estimated subsidy to borrowers would be considerably higher
if the diﬀerence between the borrowing rates and the curb market rate were used. The two move
together, however, and it seems reasonable that some part of the curb market rate would have
been to adjust for additional risk. Our estimates of the implicit subsidy must, however, prob-
ably be taken as a lower bound on the value of loans to their recipients. 
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ported on their balance sheets). As can be seen, the estimated subsidy com-
ponent of loans exceeded ordinary income in some years and represented a
substantial portion of it in others.
There was almost certainly an element of subsidy in bank lending after
1988 and even in lending at nonpreferential rates prior to that date. Esti-
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Table 13.2 Reference Interest Rates (percent per annum)
Curb Market Inflation, GDP Growth Reference
Interest Rate CPI Rate Interest Rate
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) = (2) + (3)
1961 n.a. 6.5 3.5 10.1
1962 n.a. 7.7 3.3 11.0
1963 n.a. 11.5 5.7 17.2
1964 61.8 18.1 7.3 25.3
1965 58.9 20.4 8.2 28.6
1966 58.7 17.6 9.4 26.9
1967 56.7 11.9 8.4 20.3
1968 56.0 11.0 10.2 21.2
1969 51.4 11.3 10.6 21.9
1970 50.2 13.0 10.9 23.9
1971 46.4 13.9 10.0 23.9
1972 39.0 13.7 7.0 20.7
1973 33.2 9.4 8.6 18.0
1974 40.6 13.0 8.2 21.2
1975 47.6 17.6 8.8 26.3
1976 40.5 21.6 8.4 30.0
1977 38.1 16.9 9.2 26.1
1978 41.7 13.3 10.1 23.3
1979 42.4 14.3 8.7 23.0
1980 44.9 20.5 4.7 25.1
1981 35.3 22.8 3.8 26.6
1982 33.1 19.1 3.9 22.9
1983 25.8 10.6 8.1 18.8
1984 24.8 4.3 8.7 13.0
1985 24.0 2.7 8.5 11.2
1986 23.1 2.5 8.6 11.1
1987 23.0 2.8 9.5 12.2
1988 22.7 4.3 10.8 15.1
1989 19.1 5.3 9.2 14.4
1990 18.7 7.1 8.5 15.6
1991 21.4 7.9 8.1 16.0
1992 20.2 8.0 7.9 15.9
1993 16.2 6.8 6.7 13.5
1994 16.0 5.8 6.4 12.2
1995 15.3 5.2 7.6 12.8
1996 13.7 5.2 8.0 13.2
1997 14.6 4.6 6.9 11.5
1998 n.a. 5.6 1.7 7.3
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook (various issues).
Notes: Inflation and GDP growth rates shown are three-year moving averages. n.a. = not available.
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mating its magnitude is considerably more diﬃcult, because there are no
records of the interest rates at which loans were extended. An estimate was
made using the “lending rate” reported by the IMF in International Finan-
cial Statistics, and taking the diﬀerence between the reference rate and that
rate times the volume of loans outstanding. The results of those estimates
are reported in appendix table 13A.3. Unlike the estimates used here, those
estimates probably represent the upper bounds of the magnitude of the sub-
sidy implicit in bank loans, both because some loans may have been ex-
tended at higher interest rates and because the reference rate may overstate
the “true” interest rate, especially during periods of falling inflation.
Nonetheless, even by our most conservative measure, the subsidy compo-
nent of lending was large and constituted an important element of reported
profits for the chaebol.
Figure 13.3 shows the rates of return on assets and on equity in manu-
facturing from 1962 to 1997. For the 1962–82 period for which we have es-
timates of the subsidy component of loans, estimates are given as to the
rates of return that would have prevailed, all else being equal, had there
been no subsidy implicit in borrowing. Three things should be noted. First,
rates of return declined over time. Second, in earlier periods the returns to
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Table 13.4 Estimates of Implicit Subsidy through Deposit Money Bank and Korea Development
Bank Loans (billions of won)
Through Through Sum of Ordinary Income,
Year DMB Loans KDB Loans Subsidy Estimates Manufacturing Total
1963 0.2 1.1 1.2 4.5
1964 0.5 2.2 2.7 5.6
1965 0.8 3.1 3.9 6.6
1966 1.0 2.9 3.9 11.4
1967 1.5 1.8 3.3 13.4
1968 3.1 2.3 5.5 20.6
1969 5.2 2.7 7.9 24.3
1970 9.7 4.8 14.5 22.9
1971 14.1 6.2 20.3 11.8
1972 15.8 5.7 21.5 56.5
1973 21.9 4.2 26.0 62.3
1974 44.1 10.1 54.2 176.1
1975 82.6 25.0 107.6 169.7
1976 122.1 43.6 165.7 313.6
1977 125.6 47.3 172.9 390.0
1978 135.0 52.2 187.3 615.1
1979 179.4 77.3 256.7 573.9
1980 185.0 86.8 271.8 –55.7
1981 286.4 167.7 454.1 5.6
1982 331.5 215.1 546.6 403.6
Source: The last column is from Bank of Korea, Financial Statements Analysis (various issues).
Note: Estimates of subsidy are made in tables 13A.10 and 13A.11.
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firms would have been negative had it not been for the subsidized credit.
Third, it is small wonder that chaebol were highly leveraged: given the in-
centive to use debt financing entailed in the loans, they were more profitable
for doing so, and their founders could retain a stronger controlling interest.
13.4 The Status of the Banking System and the 
Chaebol Finances at the Time of the Crisis
There is little doubt that the chaebol had strong incentives to rely on
credit rather than equity as much as they could for many years. The next
step in the analysis is to consider the chaebol and their profitability in the
years leading up to the crisis. Figure 13.4 shows the debt-equity ratios for
the “Big 5,” the largest five chaebol, and for all manufacturing firms.37 The
debt-equity ratios are given for Japan and the United States as well, for pur-
poses of comparison. The ratios for all firms included in the largest thirty
chaebol are provided in appendix table 13A.5 in the column labeled “Korea
Big 30, All Firms.”
As can be seen, and as is consistent with the incentives with which they
were confronted, the financial structures of the Korean firms were in gen-
eral highly leveraged. The manufacturing firms had a debt equivalent to
three and a half times their equity in the mid-1980s. Although this ratio de-
clined somewhat in the 1990s, it was usually two or three times higher than
those in the United States. Chaebol firms were even more highly leveraged
than Korean manufacturing as a whole.38
Obviously, highly leveraged firms are vulnerable to shocks, such as in-
creases in the cost of capital, sharp changes in macroeconomic conditions,
and sudden drops in foreign demand. The vulnerability of the chaebol was
especially dangerous, given their importance to the Korean economy. The
situation was even worse because the chaebol firms were closely linked to
each other financially. Firms belonging to the same chaebol tended to invest
in each other and guarantee the repayment of bank loans for each other. Al-
though this may make sense for the individual chaebol, from the economy-
wide viewpoint, there were risks. On one hand, chaebol activities that
should have been closed down could continue operating, given financial
support from their chaebol aﬃliates. When diﬃculties were short-run, this
support was evidently warranted. However, problems arose because there
was little way to determine when diﬃculties were short-run, and compo-
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37. Each year, the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) of the Korean government designates the
thirty largest chaebol in terms of assets and lists the firms belonging to them. The list changes
over time. The list used in this paper is the same for each year as that which the FTC designates,
and therefore changes over time. The Big 5 are Hyundai, Samsung, Daewoo, LG, and SK.
38. The debt-equity ratios, rates of return, and asset growth rates were estimated on the ba-
sis of the financial statements of firms subject to the requirement of external audit, compiled
by the National Information and Credit Evaluation agency (NICE). This source is used
throughout this paper, unless otherwise noted.
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nents of the chaebol remained in business regardless of their own situation,
reducing the profitability of the chaebol as a whole. Because of this, the high
leverage combined with subsidized lending resulted in declining rates of re-
turn for chaebol over time.39
We turn, then, to the estimated rates of return on assets in figure 13.5 and
those on equity (appendix table 13A.7), for the same comparison groups.
The rates of return were also falling during the 1990s except for the cyclical
boom years of 1994 and 1995. For all Korean manufacturing, the rate of re-
turn on assets fell from an average above 4 percent in the late 1980s to un-
der 2 percent in the early 1990s, and becoming negative in 1997. This con-
trasts sharply with rates of return in the United States, which were both
higher and more sustained (with the exception of the recession years 1991
and 1992), and Japan, where returns fell but were still about 2.3 percent in
1998, after the impact of the Asian financial crisis. Returns on equity show
the same pattern, with more pronounced fluctuations. The pattern for the
Big 5 was much the same, except that the rates of return for the chaebol
tended to be lower than for all Korean manufacturing firms over the same
period, excluding the boom years of 1994 and 1995.
Table 13.5 gives estimates of the growth rates of assets of the Korean
firms. What is striking, given the high debt-equity ratios and low rates of re-
turn of the chaebol, is the fact that the growth of their assets has been in-
comparably more rapid than that of the non-chaebol firms. As can be seen
in columns (2) to (4) the Big 30 and Big 5 have been growing at 20 to 30 per-
cent annually since the mid 1980s. As a result, their assets in 1997 at the time
of the financial crisis were 14.0 and 19.0 times, respectively, as large as in
1985.40 The same holds true within the manufacturing sector. Whereas
manufacturing as a whole saw its total assets increase 8.5 times, the Big 5’s
assets rose 20.0 times, and the assets of the firms other than the Big 5 rose
6.5 times.
As a result, chaebol assets accounted for an increasing proportion of the
corporate sector’s total. In 1985, the Big 5 chaebol firms in the data used
here held 16 percent of the assets in the manufacturing sector; the propor-
tion rose to 40 percent in 1997.
The disproportionate increase in lending to chaebol by the banks, despite
their lower returns, seems to reflect the banks’ preference for lending to the
chaebol in the later period. From the banks’ viewpoint, the chaebol were
relatively safer borrowers, as they were likely to have better collateral, and
repayments were often guaranteed by other member firms of the same
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39. It should be noted that the practice not only increased vulnerability and lowered the rates
of return for the chaebol but also doubtless resulted in the banks’ turning down loan applica-
tions from small firms that might have had very high rates of return.
40. Although Korean inflation was double-digit for some earlier years, it was relatively low
during the late 1980s and early 1990s: most of the increase in assets reflects changes in real vari-
ables. 
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chaebol. Indeed, the government intervened and set a minimum quota of
bank lending that should go to small and medium-sized firms so that their
access to bank credits might not be unduly restricted.
However, government policy was not repressive toward the chaebol. They
had come into being supported by policy favors, especially during the
(HCI) drive of the 1970s. As they grew in assets, sales, employment, exports,
and the like and increased their relative importance in the economy, they be-
came indispensable and appeared “too big to fail.”
In this regard, an episode of interest rate cuts in the early 1990s provides
an interesting case. In January 1993 and again in March 1993, interest rates
were cut. The cuts were the policy response to sharply deteriorating eco-
nomic conditions, especially falling investment (in part in response to the
American recession of 1990–91). However, it is noteworthy that these cuts
coincided with a period of financial diﬃculty for the chaebol. The return on
assets (ROA) of the Big 5 was barely 1 percent in 1991 (see fig. 13.5 and ap-
pendix table 13A.6), and there was a sharp drop in the growth rate of assets
in 1992 (table 13.5).
In two steps, the Bank of Korea lowered the rediscount rates under its
control by 2 percentage points “to counter the slowdown of economic
growth and contraction of firms’ equipment investment.” In line with the
slowing growth, the Bank “encouraged” the deposit money banks to lower
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Table 13.5 Asset Growth Rates (percentage change per annum)
Big 5
Big 30 Manufacturing
Year Total Total Manufacturing Total
1986 51.84 45.96 60.90 14.1
1987 20.03 26.44 29.15 23.4
1988 20.03 26.44 29.15 16.4
1989 31.19 27.04 31.59 22.7
1990 29.07 33.03 33.81 36.2
1991 24.17 22.09 25.20 23.0
1992 11.91 10.94 6.26 10.5
1993 12.03 10.84 11.03 15.0
1994 23.45 25.92 28.73 21.6
1995 25.57 30.20 27.81 15.5
1996 19.48 21.29 20.72 13.6
1997 34.97 40.63 42.23 24.9
1998 3.91 13.12 11.35 1.9
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. 10.6
1997/1985 (ratio) 14.4 18.7 19.7 8.5
Source: See table 13A.5.
Notes: The growth rates for Big 5 and Big 30 shown for 1987 and 1988 are averages for the two
years. Big 5 held 16 percent of all assets in manufacturing sector in 1985 and 40 percent in 1997.
n.a. = not available.
their loan rates twice, by 1 percentage point each time. Each time, their loan
and deposit rates were reduced (Bank of Korea, 1993a,b).
This is significant because the 1993 action was similar to those of earlier
years when the ROA had fallen (in 1971 and in 1980–82). If all manufac-
turing firms, including the chaebol, had had to pay interest on all their debts,
their income would have dropped almost 3.6 trillion won, more than wip-
ing out their incomes for that year (see appendix table 13A.3). The interest
rate cuts preceded the cyclical boom of 1994 and 1995, when credit expan-
sion in their aftermath resulted in rapid economic growth.
We conclude that, by 1997, the chaebol were highly vulnerable to negative
shocks. Their profitability had been falling and was low, so that there was
little margin for a reduction in cash flow or an increase in debt-servicing
costs. However, debt-servicing obligations were mounting, and cash flow
does not appear to have been increasing commensurately. The large in-
crease in lending by the commercial banks would appear to have had a sig-
nificant element of “evergreening” to it. Had the interest rate risen in 1994
or 1995 because of macroeconomic conditions, it seems reasonable to con-
jecture that NPLs would have increased substantially (or evergreening
would have increased significantly) at that time. The chaebol were over-
leveraged and vulnerable to interest rate increases.41
We turn now to the banking side of the picture. Figure 13.6 shows the
rates of return for the commercial banks during the 1990s. As can be seen,
total assets of the banks rose dramatically during the 1992–97 period, more
than tripling. Net income, however, peaked in 1994 and turned negative by
1997 (appendix table 13A.8). The rate of return on assets was falling con-
tinuously during the period, as was the rate of return on equity.
Table 13.6 provides more detail. By 1998 the combined net loss of the
banks was 46 percent of their equity. The changes up to and including the
crisis year reflect three things. The loss provision for NPLs peaked in 1994
and was declining until it rose sharply in 1997 and 1998. Provision for val-
uation loss on securities was steadily increasing. And non-operating in-
come dropped by more than 2.4 trillion won in 1997.42
There was little prior indication of the deterioration in the banks’ assets. In-
terest had been paid, although it is diﬃcult to estimate how much of this may
have been “evergreening” accounts by lending to enable chaebol to service
their debts. The sudden jump in NPLs in 1997 would seem to suggest that
evergreening had been taking place in earlier years (as shown in table 13.7).
Not all banks collapsed in 1997, and some had, for all practical purposes,
632 Anne O. Krueger and Jungho Yoo
41. Most of the chaebol sold large proportions of their products overseas. For that reason,
they were almost surely less vulnerable to exchange rate changes, as their won sales would have
increased significantly in response to a currency depreciation.
42. This loss reflects the losses banks suﬀered when they had to sell their NPLs to Korea As-
set Management Company (KAMCO), a public enterprise charged with clearing the financial
institutions’ balance sheets of their bad loans.
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been in diﬃculty earlier. Table 13.8 shows the changes in net income in
1993–98 for the six largest nationwide commercial banks. It also gives data
on the three factors that contributed most to the income changes. The last
column gives the reported NPLs on their balance sheets. As can be seen,
Seoul Bank reported virtually zero net income in 1995, as did Korea First
in 1996, before other banks experienced income losses in 1997. Their plight
seems unrelated to the currency crisis in the region or to the sudden and
sharp depreciation of the won that occurred in the last month of 1997.
There is thus considerable evidence of a weakening of the quality of the
banks’ portfolios prior to the crisis, in the sense that the financial health of
the borrowers was deteriorating. Nonetheless, the proportion of NPLs in
their portfolios was generally stationary or falling until the crisis, although
this may in part have reflected the evergreening of accounts. After the crisis,
the proportion of NPLs rose sharply, and they were then assumed by the as-
set management company, whereupon the banks booked their losses. The
key question is whether those losses were already there and being ever-
greened, or whether the events associated with the exchange rate crisis itself
precipitated the financial crisis. Certainly, the chaebol were highly lever-
aged, and a small change either in their profitability or interest charges
would have been enough to tip them into nonperforming status.
13.5 The Foreign Currency Vulnerability of the Banks
Table 13.9 gives data on foreign currency–denominated assets and liabil-
ities of the commercial banks, and appendix table 13A.9 gives the same data
for deposit money banks. As can be seen, foreign currency–denominated
assets were slightly below liabilities throughout the 1990s for both the com-
mercial banks and the deposit money banks. At their peak in February
1998, postcrisis, commercial banks’ liabilities denominated in foreign cur-
rency were 25.1 percent of total liabilities, whereas assets were 21.8 percent.
The same general pattern held for deposit money banks, although the im-
balance between foreign currency assets and liabilities was smaller. Inter-
estingly, both the assets and liabilities had risen by about the same percent-
age during the crisis months, although the gap between them was about 2
percent wider in early 1998 than it had been in mid-1997.
A question that these data do not answer is the extent to which the
Chaebol Capitalism and the Currency-Financial Crisis in Korea 635
Table 13.7 NPLs of the Commercial Banks
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Billion won 8.27 10.16 11.93 11.39 12.48 11.87 22.85 21.22
Percent of loans 7.0 7.1 7.4 5.8 5.2 4.1 6.2 7.4
Source: Financial Supervisory Commission, online service.
Table 13.8 Factors behind the Sudden Changes in Income, Individual Banks (billions of won)
Net Provision Provision for Non-Operating NPLs,
Income for NPLs Valuation Loss Income Reported
Choheung
1993 975 1,520 –72 68 n.a.
1994 1,363 2,967 44 125 14,465
1995 1,066 1,867 860 181 15,476
1996 1,102 1,484 873 214 14,137
1997 –2,896 3,891 3,094 –1,136 26,232
1998 –19,708 5,840 n.a. –10,071 15,155
Korea 
Commercial 
Bank
1993 87 1,376 –32 50 n.a.
1994 545 3,622 423 2,205 20,260
1995 916 1,860 776 999 19,193
1996 1,055 893 686 442 10,340
1997 –1,639 1,775 1,982 -1,206 14,512
1998 –16,438 3,721 n.a. –9,918 9,686
Han II
1993 1,195 660 22 56 n.a.
1994 1,292 1,490 342 117 12,131
1995 805 828 875 120 11,569
1996 590 688 974 142 6,756
1997 –2,809 2,989 3,634 –313 13,244
1998 –17,166 5,696 n.a. –3,795 17,495
Korea 
Exchange 
Bank
1993 834 1,224 –107 16 n.a.
1994 1,003 2,996 –109 90 17,886
1995 1,053 1,700 501 125 17,433
1996 1,041 1,283 757 58 12,943
1997 –684 2,859 2,072 –1,543 25,176
1998 –8,435 2,056 n.a. –8,927 15,084
Korea First
1993 1,541 913 –36 7 n.a.
1994 1,313 3,168 354 50 14,186
1995 174 2,667 112 188 15,913
1996 62 2,732 871 393 18,697
1997 –16,151 4,514 3,518 –9,064 30,559
1998 –26,149 2,581 n.a. –6,769 38,323
Seoul
1993 103 1,712 –19 107 n.a.
1994 531 2,694 33 103 16,958
1995 50 2,216 341 204 16,639
1996 –1,668 2,735 977 208 20,353
1997 –9,166 1,731 3,047 –3,996 24,040
1998 –22,424 3,530 n.a. –2,266 29,872
Source: Financial Supervisory Commission, online service.
Note: n.a. = not available.
quality of the assets and the liabilities were similar. At the time of the crisis,
there were reports that many of the loans denominated in foreign currency
were to Indonesia, Thailand, and Russia, and that one of the factors precip-
itating the Korean crisis was the nonperformance of those loans. The data
may therefore understate the diﬀerential between foreign currency assets
and liabilities when risk-adjusted. Even so, it is not evident that the diﬀeren-
tial was so large that exchange rate changes should have triggered a major
decline in the banks’ balance sheets. To the extent that there was deteriora-
tion caused by the exchange-rate change, it would have had to be either in
the ability of the chaebol to service their outstanding debts or in the failure
of foreign debtors to continue servicing their loans to Korean banks.
13.6 Conclusions
The chaebol were in weak financial condition long before the crisis. Al-
though the data do not indicate an increase in NPLs, the rapid increase in
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Table 13.9 Foreign Currency–Denominated Assets and Liabilities, Commercial Banks 
(billions of won)
Assets Liabilities
Foreign Currency– Share Foreign Currency– Share
Total Denominated (%) Total Denominated (%)
1991 161,516.6 18,511.7 11.5 147,736.0 19,169.8 13.0
1992 180,615.6 20,809.4 11.5 165,724.4 20,963.7 12.6
1993 194,988.6 23,787.2 12.2 178,766.0 24,672.2 13.8
1994 228,961.5 30,165.5 13.2 210,044.8 31,313.1 14.9
1995 288,687.8 39,621.3 13.7 267,308.2 40,466.9 15.1
1996 341,558.7 51,861.5 15.2 318,321.7 52,802.2 16.6
1997
J 354,654.9 55,596.3 15.7 325,827.7 55,608.7 17.1
A 360,179.4 56,504.4 15.7 331,075.6 57,767.2 17.4
S 402,529.2 58,197.9 14.5 370,370.1 59,758.2 16.1
O 414,296.5 61,738.5 14.9 381,377.5 64,719.6 17.0
N 435,322.1 72,772.1 16.7 402,357.5 74,440.5 18.5
D 483,498.6 96,448.7 19.9 461,208.8 102,828.2 22.3
1998
J 498,298.8 101,167.1 20.3 467,189.8 113,532.7 24.3
F 504,682.4 110,024.8 21.8 472,441.0 118,551.5 25.1
M 479,636.4 96,407.9 20.1 445,908.6 99,483.8 22.3
A 469,613.1 93,215.7 19.8 435,165.8 96,635.3 22.2
M 471,013.8 97,461.6 20.7 435,140.6 101,132.7 23.2
J 467,583.0 92,560.0 19.8 433,414.5 96,257.4 22.2
J 459,565.3 81,936.0 17.8 425,298.6 85,374.6 20.1
1998
D 469,280.5 72,676.7 15.5 448,765.9 70,633.9 15.7
1999 519,748.6 58,092.9 11.2 493,261.7 55,028.4 11.2
Source: Bank of Korea, Monthly Statistical Bulletin (various issues).
assets, combined with their deteriorating profitability, certainly seems to in-
dicate that the banks were evergreening the outstanding chaebol debt. If
even a quarter of the net increase in chaebol borrowing from the banks was
evergreened, the banks were in very bad shape prior to the Korean crisis in
1997.
In an important sense, the vulnerability of the system was extreme. While
very favorable conditions—increased semiconductor prices on world mar-
kets, falling world interest rates, a pickup in economic activity in the rest of
the world—might have prevented the crisis and enabled the chaebol to re-
gain profitability and reduce the degree to which they were leveraged, their
behavior during the boom of 1994 and 1995 does not suggest that they were
inclined to do so. Instead, in the boom years, they continued to borrow and
to increase their assets, while the rate of return remained low with only a
slight cyclical upturn.
The conclusion must be that the Korean crisis was a disaster waiting to
happen: When very favorable circumstances did not materialize, the needed
increase in evergreening was more rapid than the system could tolerate. The
foreign exchange crisis itself probably did not trigger the financial crisis:
rather, the increase in interest rates did.
The chaebol debts to the banks are the chief culprit, and because the chae-
bol were major exporters, the change in the exchange rate per se probably
did not harm their ability to service their debts. However, the increased in-
terest rate clearly did.
In the short run, therefore, more exchange rate depreciation and less in-
terest rate increase—as was in fact the chosen stabilization path—was
probably appropriate. Failure to raise the interest rate at all would surely
have resulted in larger capital outflows and perpetuated the foreign ex-
change crisis. Indeed, as was seen, there were doubts over the several weeks
after the first IMF program that the package as undertaken was enough.
However, further increases in the interest rate (which probably would have
reduced the magnitude of exchange rate depreciation) would surely have in-
tensified the financial crisis.
At an analytical level, the impact of the exchange rate depreciation on the
banks’ balance sheets either directly or indirectly through the ability of the
chaebol to service their debts must be deemed to have been relatively small
in the Korean case. The fundamental problem was the magnitude of the
chaebol precrisis leveraging. That, in turn, made the postcrisis workout of
the banking system extremely diﬃcult because of the necessity of restruc-
turing the finances of the chaebol first.
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Appendix
Chronology of Selected Events
1945 Liberation from Japanese colonial rule
1948 Establishment of Republic of Korea
1950–53 Korean war
1957–58 IMF stabilization program
1960–65 Announcement of first major step in trade policy reform and
continuous expansion of export incentives
1961 Nationalization of commercial banks
1964 Major devaluation of won, the domestic currency
1965 Unification of exchange rates; move to positive real interest rate
for commercial banks
1967 Korea joins the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade
(GATT); import regime is liberalized by switching from positive
list to negative list system
1972 First domestic debt crisis; presidential emergency decree places
a three-year moratorium on the payment of corporate debts to
curb-market lenders
1973 Government launches a heavy and chemical industry (HCI)
drive
1979 Government announces “comprehensive stabilization pro-
gram,” which ends the HCI drive
1980 Major devaluation of the won; further trade liberalization, in-
cluding multi-year tariﬀ reduction plan
1980s “Rationalization” of industries in financial troubles
1983 Privatization of commercial banks
1988 Interest rate deregulation begins
1989 Piecemeal liberalization of international financial transactions
begins, including a more market-determined exchange rate
1993 Government announces “new economy 100 days plan”; Bank of
Korea lowers its rediscount rates from 7 to 5 percent
1996 Korea joins OECD; commitments to financial liberalization are
made
1997 December: Korea and IMF agree on a rescue package; free float-
ing exchange rate system
1998 Sweeping reform and liberalization of financial sector
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Table 13A.1 Korea’s GDP, GDP Per Capita, Investment, Capital Inflows, and Saving
(1960–2000)
Real GDP GDP per capita Investments Saving Capital Inflow,
Year (billions of 1995 won) (1995 won) (%) (%) Net (%)
1960 24,524.5 981.4 10.8 1.4 9.3
1965 33,207.5 1,158.3 14.8 7.5 7.4
1970 56,209.0 1,788.1 25.4 18.2 8.1
1975 82,257.5 2,372.0 28.7 19.4 9.0
1980 114,977.7 3,073.7 31.9 24.2 8.5
1985 167,501.9 4,142.8 30.0 30.6 0.8
1990 263,430.4 6,068.3 37.7 37.6 0.8
1995 377,349.8 8,459.1 37.2 35.4 1.8
1999 436,798.5 9,321.4 26.8 33.5 –6.1
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook (various issues) and online service.
Table 13A.2 Foreign Trade in the Korean Economy (1960–2000)
Exports Imports Exports/ Imports/
Year ($millions) ($millions) GDP (%) GDP (%)
For Goods and Services on the Balance-of-Payments Basis
1960 116.9 379.2 3.4 12.7
1965 289.8 488.4 8.6 16.2
1970 1,379.0 2,181.7 13.8 23.9
1975 5,883.6 7,997.2 27.2 35.7
1980 19,815.3 25,151.5 32.7 40.6
1985 30,455.4 30,017.0 32.9 32.1
1990 73,295.4 76,360.5 29.1 30.3
1995 147,459.5 154,882.5 30.2 31.7
1999 171,692.4 143,972.5 42.1 35.3
For Goods Only on the Custom Clearance Basis
1960 32.8 343.5 1.0 11.5
1965 175.1 463.4 5.2 15.3
1970 835.2 1,984.0 8.3 21.8
1975 5,081.0 7,274.4 23.5 32.5
1980 17,504.9 22,291.7 28.9 36.0
1985 26,632.6 26,652.8 28.8 28.5
1990 65,015.7 69,843.7 25.8 27.7
1995 125,058.0 135,118.9 25.6 27.6
1999 143,685.5 119,752.3 35.2 29.3
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook (various issues).
Table 13A.3 Estimates of Upper Bounds of Subsidy through DMB Loans 
(billions of won)
Ordinary Income,
Year Estimate I Estimate II Manufacturing Total
1963 1.5 n.a. 4.5
1964 5.5 n.a. 5.6
1965 7.1 n.a. 6.6
1966 2.4 n.a. 11.4
1967 –4.8 n.a. 13.4
1968 –7.4 n.a. 20.6
1969 –13.5 n.a. 24.3
1970 –2.2 n.a. 22.9
1971 7.2 n.a. 11.8
1972 28.7 n.a. 56.5
1973 30.0 n.a. 62.3
1974 93.8 n.a. 176.1
1975 243.0 n.a. 169.7
1976 373.5 n.a. 313.6
1977 326.1 n.a. 390.0
1978 253.6 n.a. 615.1
1979 267.0 n.a. 573.9
1980 91.6 754.8 –55.7
1981 847.4 1,316.5 5.6
1982 1,628.3 2,044.8 403.6
1983 n.a. 1,946.1 1,454.3
1984 n.a. 790.2 1,619.1
1985 n.a. 372.8 1,666.5
1986 n.a. 399.4 2,839.4
1987 n.a. 921.1 3,413.5
1988 n.a. 2,299.1 4,433.1
1989 n.a. 1,749.7 2,950.7
1990 n.a. 3,851.9 3,575.7
1991 n.a. 4,873.3 3,199.2
1992 n.a. 5,678.1 2,948.4
1993 n.a. 5,348.9 3,855.8
1994 n.a. 4,586.5 7,623.0
1995 n.a. 5,410.5 11,842.4
1996 n.a. 7,213.1 3,551.7
1997 n.a. –721.0 –1,408.7
1998 n.a. –16,004.9 –7,754.1
Notes: This estimation recognizes that DMBs’ general purpose loans other than the loans en-
joying preferential rates also had an element of subsidy, since the loan rates were lower than a
market-clearing rate might have been. However, Estimate II, since it must make use of the
IFS’s “lending rate,” is an estimate of the upper bounds of subsidy rather than that of actual
subsidy.
Estimate I is made by multiplying the total loans less sum of preferential loans (table 13.3)
by the difference between the reference interest rate (table 13.2) and the loan rate applied to
“discounts on commercial bills” (table 13.1).
Estimate II is made by multiplying the total loans (table 13.3) by the difference between the
reference interest rates and the lending rates (table 13.1). n.a. = not available.
Table 13A.4 Rates of Return, Manufacturing Sector (percent per annum)
Year ROA ROAa ROE ROEa
1962 8.9 7.8 22.6 19.8
1963 9.7 7.1 18.8 13.7
1964 7.5 3.9 15.1 7.8
1965 7.9 3.3 15.3 6.3
1966 7.8 5.1 16.9 11.1
1967 6.8 5.1 17.0 12.8
1968 5.3 3.9 16.1 11.8
1969 3.7 2.5 13.5 9.1
1970 2.5 0.9 10.7 3.9
1971 0.9 –0.6 4.4 –3.2
1972 3.4 2.1 14.2 8.8
1973 2.6 1.5 9.6 5.6
1974 4.8 3.3 20.0 13.9
1975 3.4 1.2 14.7 5.4
1976 4.1 1.9 19.1 9.0
1977 3.8 2.1 18.0 10.0
1978 4.4 3.0 20.3 14.2
1979 3.0 1.6 14.1 7.8
1980 –0.2 –1.2 –1.2 –6.8
1981 0.0 –1.2 0.1 –6.8
1982 0.9 –0.3 4.6 –1.6
1983 3.1 n.a. 14.1 n.a.
1984 3.2 n.a. 14.1 n.a.
1985 2.8 n.a. 12.5 n.a.
1986 4.2 n.a. 18.8 n.a.
1987 4.1 n.a 17.9 n.a
1988 4.6 n.a. 18.2 n.a.
1989 2.5 n.a. 8.7 n.a.
1990 2.2 n.a. 8.5 n.a.
1991 1.6 n.a. 6.5 n.a.
1992 1.3 n.a. 5.6 n.a.
1993 1.5 n.a. 6.0 n.a.
1994 2.5 n.a. 9.9 n.a.
1995 3.3 n.a. 12.8 n.a.
1996 0.9 n.a. 3.6 n.a.
1997 –0.3 n.a. –1.4 n.a.
1998 –1.5 n.a. –6.0 n.a.
1999 1.4 n.a. 4.3 n.a.
Source: ROA and ROE are estimates based on Bank of Korea, Financial Statements Analysis
(various issues).
Note: n.a. = not available.
aIndicates that numerator is ordinary income less subsidy estimates reported in table 13.6.
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Table 13A.8 Rates of Return, Commercial Banks Total 
Total Assets Net Income ROA ROE
Year (billions of won) (billions of won) (%) (%)
1992 167,425.1 931.5 0.71 6.56
1993 198,481.3 889.0 0.62 5.90
1994 250,081.2 1,048.2 0.62 6.09
1995 340,543.0 867.8 0.38 4.19
1996 415,437.8 846.9 0.31 3.80
1997 542,552.8 –3,919.9 –1.06 –14.19
1998 560,059.7 –12,510.6 –3.15 –46.15
1999 550,345.3 –5,996.0 –1.42 –19.62
Source: Financial Supervisory Commission, online service, available at [http://www.fsc.go.kr].
Table 13A.9 Foreign Currency–Denominated Assets and Liabilities, Deposit Money Banks
(billions of won)
Assets Liabilities
Foreign Currency– Share Foreign Currency– Share 
Total Denominated (%) Total Denominated (%)
1991 220,388.9 19,468.4 8.8 205,736.3 19,890.5 9.7
1992 251,321.4 21,936.1 8.7 235,470.7 21,802.8 9.3
1993 275,689.9 25,339.1 9.2 258,353.5 26,035.6 10.1
1994 322,956.2 32,294.4 10.0 302,300.1 32,856.3 10.9
1995 379,517.1 41,872.6 11.0 356,754.7 42,157.2 11.8
1996 451,180.2 55,390.7 12.3 426,074.9 55,445.4 13.0
1997
J 467,317.3 59,759.7 12.8 433,348.2 58,823.7 13.6
A 474,123.4 60,605.0 12.8 439,853.5 60,720.3 13.8
S 486,928.8 61,079.6 12.5 452,840.5 61,870.5 13.7
O 499,979.2 64,830.9 13.0 464,928.4 66,957.9 14.4
N 523,516.3 76,362.1 14.6 488,161.1 76,587.6 15.7
D 573,695.5 100,370.8 17.5 550,809.0 105,597.1 19.2
1998
J 587,023.5 105,081.9 17.9 554,035.1 116,204.9 21.0
F 593,032.3 114,330.5 19.3 558,806.3 121,549.8 21.8
M 568,554.5 100,139.0 17.6 532,861.5 101,892.1 19.1
A 557,955.0 96,606.7 17.3 521,434.1 98,887.7 19.0
M 559,347.1 101,118.8 18.1 521,442.7 103,574.4 19.9
J 558,430.3 96,174.0 17.2 522,543.7 98,821.8 18.9
J 552,177.6 84,909.6 15.4 516,205.7 87,797.6 17.0
1998
D 576,919.5 75,757.1 13.1 554,868.3 72,683.9 13.1
1999 640,011.2 61,181.4 9.6 611,824.4 57,534.5 9.4
Source: Bank of Korea, Monthly Statistical Bulletin (various issues).
Table 13A.10 Estimates of Subsidy through DMB Loans (billions of won)
Loan Loans for Machine Loans for Equipment Loans Subsidy
Year for Trade Industry Promotion of Export Industry NIF Estimates
1963 0.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.2
1964 0.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.5
1965 0.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.8
1966 1.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.0
1967 1.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.5
1968 3.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.1
1969 4.7 0.5 n.a. n.a. 5.2
1970 8.1 1.5 n.a. n.a. 9.7
1971 12.2 1.9 n.a. n.a. 14.1
1972 13.9 1.9 n.a. n.a. 15.8
1973 19.0 1.9 1.1 n.a. 21.9
1974 36.1 2.6 4.2 1.2 44.1
1975 65.4 3.4 8.4 5.3 82.6
1976 90.4 4.8 11.9 15.0 122.1
1977 93.4 3.9 9.0 19.3 125.6
1978 107.3 2.5 5.3 20.0 135.0
1979 147.3 1.6 3.5 27.0 179.4
1980 151.9 0.6 1.3 31.1 185.0
1981 226.8 0.7 8.0 50.9 286.4
1982 271.0 0.3 n.a. 60.2 331.5
Notes: Estimates are based on tables 13.1–13.3. For the purpose of estimation the amount of a loan for a
given year is taken to be the same as the average of the outstanding loan amounts at the end of the year
and of the previous year. n.a. = not available.
Table 13A.11 KDB Loans and Interest Rate
KDB Loans to Manufacturing Sector KDB Interest Rate 
Year (billions of won) (%)
1962 11.0 8.4
1963 11.9 8.3
1964 13.2 8.4
1965 16.4 9.6
1966 21.2 13.0
1967 24.6 13.1
1968 29.0 13.1
1969 37.3 14.7
1970 51.7 14.5
1971 65.4 14.4
1972 75.4 13.1
1973 79.0 12.8
1974 118.6 12.7
1975 186.7 12.9
1976 258.0 13.1
1977 377.4 13.6
1978 550.7 13.9
1979 856.8 13.9
1980 1348.9 18.7
1981 1771.2 17.1
1982 2097.6 12.7
Source: Bank of Korea, Monthly Statistical Bulletin (various issues).
Note: One representative interest rate was estimated for each year.
Table 13A.12 Won/Dollar Exchange Rate
End of Period Period Average
1980 659.9 607.9
1981 700.5 681.3
1982 748.8 731.5
1983 795.5 776.2
1984 827.4 806.0
1985 890.2 870.5
1986 861.4 881.3
1987 792.3 822.4
1988 684.1 730.5
1989 679.6 671.4
1990 716.4 708.0
1991 760.8 733.6
1992 788.4 780.8
1993 808.1 802.7
1994 788.7 803.6
1995 774.7 771.0
1996 844.2 804.8
1997
J 892.0 890.5
A 902.0 895.9
S 914.8 909.5
O 965.1 921.9
N 1,163.8 1,025.6
D 1,415.2 1,484.1
1998
J 1,572.9 1,706.8
F 1,640.1 1,623.1
M 1,378.8 1,505.3
A 1,338.2 1,392.0
M 1,410.8 1,394.6
J 1,385.2 1,397.2
J 1,236.0 1,300.8
1998
D 1,207.8 1,213.7
1999 1,145.4 1,189.5
Source: Bank of Korea, online service, available at [http://www.bok.or.kr].
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Comment Jorge Braga de Macedo
Anne O. Krueger, one of the world’s experts on Korea, has joined forces with
Jungho Yoo to understand the factors leading to the Korean financial crisis
of late 1997. The authors suggest a chain of causation going from chaebol
capitalism to the collapse of the won, via weak banks and excessive foreign
borrowing. As stated in the conclusion, the “chaebol were in weak financial
condition long before the crisis,” the extreme vulnerability of the system be-
ing due to the fact that “banks were ‘evergreening’ the outstanding chaebol
debt.” In short, “the Korean crisis was a disaster waiting to happen.”
In terms of diagnostics, Krueger and Yoo conclude that there was no cur-
rency trigger for crisis but rather that the increase in interest rates made
chaebol debt to banks more diﬃcult to service. Since exports helped recov-
ery, they surmise that the path of stabilization was probably appropriate.
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The paper ends with the argument that “the necessity of restructuring the
finances of the chaebol first” made “the postcrisis workout of the banking
system extremely diﬃcult.” Depending on whether the diﬃculty is over-
come, then, future prospects will be better or worse.
While Krueger and Yoo do not attempt to measure the relative impor-
tance of each one of the four factors they mention, Dekle and Kletzer (chap.
11 in this volume) show a fairly consistent pairing of Korea and Thailand
on the one hand and Singapore and Taiwan on the other in terms of rising
financial reputation. Malaysia is somewhere in between, and the debate
continues on whether its response to the crisis was special. In chapter 9 in
this volume, Rudi Dornbusch shows convincingly that this is not so, while
Kaplan and Rodrik (chap. 8) present evidence in defense of the Malaysian
way.
According to the latest country survey by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD; 2001) the sustained recovery of the
Korean economy is threatened by the possibility that reforms may stall.
Since then, of course, the rise in the price of oil and the slowdown of world
growth have each taken a toll as output fell in the fourth quarter of 2000. In
this comment I plan to elaborate on this point and to assess whether the cri-
sis helped bring about structural reforms that could prevent future crises. In
so doing I will go back in time, following the historical and institutional ap-
proach of Krueger and Yoo but perhaps giving greater weight to the ambi-
guity of domestic liberalization in Korea, following the common descrip-
tion of the country as a “permit kingdom.”
With respect to the currency-financial crisis itself, it is generally ac-
knowledged that a financial crisis with severe real consequences on the
economy typically involves a combination of exchange rate devaluation,
debt service diﬃculties, and banking failures (Dornbusch, chap. 16, in this
volume; Macedo 1999), and that the three elements were undoubtedly
present in Korea. Moreover, recalling earlier National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER) work on the Korean financial crisis, summarized in
McHale (2000), it is evident that noted Korean economists tend to see this
crisis as a good example of contagion through herd behavior, rather than as
a “disaster waiting to happen.”
It is to be hoped that taking the analysis back in time and giving greater
weight to domestic distortions will help promote consensus on the Korean
pattern of development, which was once described as a miracle but has re-
cently come under closer scrutiny, notably through the regular OECD peer
reviews.
Korean Miracle?
Korea can certainly be seen as one of the best examples of what was
called the Asian miracle. Not only was its 1960 gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita about the same as Sudan’s, but growth expectations at the
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time were also higher for Africa than for Southeast Asia. Krueger and Yoo
coin the elegant phrase an “export theory of value” held by Korean policy
makers over the last four decades, illustrating the power of export-led
growth over import-substituting industrialization.
This power has been recognized at least since the work of Ian Little, Ti-
bor Scitovsky, and Maurice Scott at the OECD Development Center in
the late 1960s. Anne’s former colleague at Stanford Ron McKinnon (1973)
pointed out, however, that financial development was often neglected in the
assessment of experiences of export-led growth, which tended to focus on
trade in goods and services rather than trade in assets. International trade
theory shows that value comes from imports, not exports, so that the export
theory of value is bound to tolerate or even to create domestic distortions.
The distortions may pertain to domestic factor mobility between sectors, as
captured by the traditional Fei-Ranis two-sector model of domestic labor
mobility from agriculture to manufacturing. This model was taught for
many years at the Yale Economic Growth Center as a rationalization of the
Asian miracle. There are many other sources of distortion, however, from
imperfect competition in goods markets to financial repression.
At the Growth Center’s twenty-fifth anniversary conference, McKinnon
introduced macroeconomic instability as an additional distortion and
showed how this distortion exacerbated the Stiglitz-Weiss equilibrium
credit rationing brought about by the inability of banks to monitor project
returns perfectly. Indeed, McKinnon (1988, 390) noted that, compared to
Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore, Korea in 1980 “had a much lower ratio of
M2 to GDP (0.34) and had to make up for this shortage of domestic loan-
able funds by borrowing heavily abroad.” Again, the Singapore-Taiwan pair
is close to the Japanese benchmark.
The interaction between macro-instability and the covariance of returns
is bad enough. In Korea, however, the determining factor of the crisis may
have been the interaction between industrial and financial structures asso-
ciated with the export theory of value thought to be behind the Korean mir-
acle.
Industrial and Financial Structure
The latest OECD survey (2001) summarizes Korea’s industrial structure
as follows:
One dilemma for Korean policymakers, both before and after the crisis,
has been setting appropriate policies to deal with the chaebols, which
have played a key role in the country’s economic development. Chaebols
are large conglomerates linking many individual companies—an average
of 27 in 1997—that are diversified across a wide range of industries. The
companies are linked by centralized family control and management,
ownership links and mutual debt guarantees that facilitate high levels of
leverage. At the beginning of the 1980s, the authorities were faced with
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two possible methods of dealing with the chaebols, a transition to a free-
market economy in which the pressure of stakeholders, competition,
both domestic and international, and the threat of bankruptcy would
discipline chaebol behavior; or the use of various regulations on financ-
ing, investment and loan guarantees to control the chaebols.
The authorities relied primarily on the latter approach to limit the role
of the conglomerates. This choice, however, has had several negative con-
sequences. First, it implied considerable government intervention in the
private-sector’s economic decision-making, thus limiting the role of mar-
ket forces. The negative impact was compounded by the lack of an eﬀec-
tive corporate governance framework to guide management decision-
making. Second, it created considerable moral hazard for chaebols,
which were essentially protected from bankruptcy. Policies to limit the
role of the conglomerates were accompanied by measures to assist small
and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), which, nevertheless, remained a
relatively backward part of the Korean economy.
Korea’s industrialization was led by large firms aﬃliated with the chae-
bols. During the 1960s and 1970s, SMEs accounted for only a third of
growth in value-added and less than half of the rise in employment. Since
the end of the Heavy and Chemical Industry drive of the 1970s, govern-
ment policy has gradually shifted to place more emphasis on assisting
SMEs in ways that have not always been market-conforming.
As the literature on financial structure in Japan and Germany quoted by
McKinnon (1973, 1988) emphasizes, the preference for conglomerates, in-
cluding financial institutions (called grupos in Latin America), has disad-
vantages that become apparent during the process of economic develop-
ment. The eﬀects of linking a financial structure too closely with the
industrial structure go beyond the eﬃciency with which saving is trans-
formed into productive investment. Under the grupos system, no domestic
constituency for financial freedom arises, and that bailout guarantees be-
come part of corporate culture. As illustrated by Macedo (1996) regarding
the Portuguese change in economic regime toward stability in convertibility
that preceded the creation of the euro, all of this makes the combination of
political and financial freedom appear less relevant, and thus threatens the
growth of civil society. 
Other examples can be gathered from Latin America and Europe. Per-
haps the most celebrated case is the bailout of Banco Osorno in 1997 by
Chilean authorities, to which Carlos Diaz-Alejandro attributed the bank-
ing crash of a few years later. Some work along these lines has been carried
out for European countries in the process of development (Macedo 1988),
and the role of the curb market in Korea and Turkey was investigated in
Sweder van Winjbergen’s Ph.D. dissertation at MIT in the late 1970s. Re-
cently, Bradley (2001) contrasted the Korean to the Irish model, with the
latter encouraging “export-oriented foreign investment inflows,” in contrast
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to the former’s exclusive objective of “capturing greater export market
share.”
In other words, to understand chaebol capitalism it is essential to go back
to the heavy and chemical industry period in the mid-1970s, which not co-
incidentally was used as a model for the Portuguese nationalization of
banks and insurance companies in 1975 by the industry minister João Crav-
inho.1 Note that chaebol are not allowed to own banks—the 4 percent limit
on bank ownership is designed specifically to exclude them. However, they
have been allowed to own nonbank financial institutions and have used
them as cash cows, with the result of a falling market share for banks. In
sum, when the Korean administration embraced globalization in the early
1990s, it did not put in place the appropriate governance structures, and the
question is whether this contradiction remained after the crisis. 
Crisis and Recovery 
In spite of the distortions in the industrial and financial structures, there
was no sense of vulnerability—instead, complacency was widespread in
policy circles as the 1997 Korean presidential election neared. No one
thought of calling the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the summer
of 1997 (despite the gloom Krueger observed at that time). Indeed, during
the NBER meeting on Korea’s crisis, Jeﬀ Shafer made it clear that banks
were not being asked to coordinate a response in November. Dooley and
Shin (2000) note that central bank deposits in foreign currency rose from
zero to US$5 billion in the week of 17 November and to US$10 billion in
the week of 24 November; this rate would have exhausted reserves by the
time the IMF program was announced. Dooley and Shin (2000) also report
that the rollover of credits falls to 24 percent in the first week of December,
from a 50 percent average in October. As they note, the lack of reliable fig-
ures on useable foreign exchange reserves, foreign debt, nonperforming
loans, and so on was astonishing. Whatever the initial complacency, once
the debt/banking crisis hit, combining the end of the passive dollar peg with
tight money may have been the only viable alternative, even though a huge
controversy remains in Korea about the appropriateness of the IMF’s mon-
etary conditions. 
It is widely recognized that the Korean recovery was faster than that of
other OECD economies—namely, Mexico, Turkey, Sweden, and Fin-
land—that had been hit by financial crises. The main reason noted in the
OECD survey (2001) is that import compression was greater in Korea than
in the other countries, to the point that the current account balance moved
Chaebol Capitalism and the Currency-Financial Crisis in Korea 653
1. Cravinho does not mention the Korean model in his written remarks at the 1976 interna-
tional conference on the Portuguese economy, but he did make the point while presenting his
paper. 
into a surplus that reached 13 percent of GDP. The increase in reserves was
sterilized, so that there was no increase in inflation. Wage flexibility is an-
other reason for the subdued response of inflation to the sharp fall in the
currency. The decline in nominal wages in 1998 prevented a wage-price spi-
ral. 
The central bank was given independence in matters of monetary policy,
with a regime that may be characterized as “quasi–inflation targeting” at a
rate set around 2.5 percent per annum. The monetary regime remains am-
biguous, however, because there is the objective of seeking a current ac-
count surplus, which may confuse the market. 
In addition, an activist fiscal policy toward SMEs is being implemented,
and the past tradition of government handouts to enterprises may not yet
have been fully overcome, even though the stated objective is to promote the
new economy. This explains part of the debt buildup (with debt reaching 40
percent of GDP), even though much of it is government-guaranteed debt
related to financial-sector restructuring.
The danger of expenditure rises due to the social safety net, North Ko-
rea, and tax reform may be less now than it was in 2000; but, on the other
hand, Korea is set to experience the most rapid aging process of any OECD
country.
The structural reforms brought about by the crisis thus pertain to the
macroeconomic regime, including the independence of the central bank,
more eﬀective financial supervision, the beginning of public-debt manage-
ment, and more transparent budgetary procedures. Because a new govern-
ment framework cannot change the industrial and financial structure, more
progress is to be expected in areas related to the issue of how the govern-
ment is dealing with the chaebol, such as competition policy, regulatory re-
form, and corporate governance. Until then, the signals are conflicting. On
the one hand, the government limits and controls the chaebol through the
Fair Trade Commission, which has enforced rules on intragroup dealing,
cross-ownership, and debt guarantees since the late 1980s. On the other
hand, the government is involved in guiding companies’ decisions.
Competition
One measure of competition, the degree of mark-up of price over cost for
manufactured goods, suggests that—before the crisis—competition was
relatively weak in Korea compared to other OECD countries (it was found
to be 36 percent in Korea, compared with 25 percent in Japan, 20 percent
in Germany, and 15 percent in the United States).
After recent initiatives to promote competition through reforming gov-
ernment regulations, strengthening competition policy, reducing trade bar-
riers, encouraging inflows of direct foreign investment, and privatizing
state-owned enterprise, it can be said with the OECD (2000) regulatory re-
view:
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[T]he competition law and competition authority are well designed, con-
sistent with good international practices. The most serious kinds of hor-
izontal agreements are now treated more harshly and the Fair Trade
Commission is moving away from a purely structural approach to abuse
of dominance. Most statutory exemptions have now been eliminated. En-
forcement processes are adequate, although more power to collect evi-
dence would be welcome, and criminal sanctions may not be eﬀective.
Consumer protection is also the responsibility of the competition agency,
helping ensure that consumers see the benefits of market-based reforms.
Competition authorities have also been responsible for chaebol policy,
though many chaebol policies deal with corporate governance and fi-
nancial prudence rather than with competition policy. Chaebol reforms
may also involve conventional competition policy issues such as market
domination, exclusion, and discrimination, that can be dealt with using
consistent economy-wide principles.
After the crisis, the Korea Asset Management Corporation was created
to buy bad loans, and it has been very successful in selling those loans to
private investors. However, there have been no sales of the government
shares in recapitalized banks held by the Korean Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration. There also remains considerable ambiguity about the extent of
government involvement in enterprises. This is especially worrying in view
of likely political paralysis toward the end of the year, with both presiden-
tial and local elections scheduled in 2002.
Since the crisis, the chaebol have restructured by reducing debt-equity ra-
tios and cutting the number of aﬃliates. Hyundai, in particular, will soon
become three separate chaebol, as shareholding ties are cut. This is a posi-
tive development because it limits the risk of chain insolvencies. Neverthe-
less, the chaebol as a group remain highly indebted (they increased equity
more than they cut debt during the sharp 1998–2000 upturn).
Regulatory Reform
Quoting the survey, “the conglomerates’ measures to reduce the number
of aﬃliates and sell assets created competitive opportunities for SMEs. In
addition, the requirement that chaebols lower their debt to equity ratios to
200 per cent reduced their borrowing from banks, improving loan avail-
ability for smaller firms. Indeed, SMEs accounted for 46 per cent of the in-
crease in bank lending in 1999.”
According to the review, new disciplines of transparency and market
principles are needed throughout the entire policy apparatus, at all levels of
government. Massive deregulation was accomplished in 1998–99, when the
number of government regulations was cut by nearly 50 percent. Reforms
are now shifting toward more proactive and comprehensive attention to
regulatory quality and institution building. Institutions have been estab-
lished to promote regulatory reform at political and administrative levels.
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Korea has taken steps to improve regulatory transparency, although stake-
holder representation in decision making should be broadened. Korea’s
program of regulatory impact analysis (RIA) is well conceived, although
implementation by the ministries remains weak and new legislation pro-
posed by the members of parliament is not subject to RIA. Transparency
and accountability would be boosted by establishing independent sectoral
regulators. Implementation is now a high priority to embed new practices
throughout the public administration, since, as President Kim Dae-Jung
said, “Reform must begin with the government.”
Corporate Governance
In spite of the reforms induced by the crisis, the survey argues that the
creation of a strong corporate governance framework will require signifi-
cant changes in Korea’s corporate culture. To hasten such changes, de-
tailed, prescriptive legal measures that in some cases go beyond those found
in other countries are needed to achieve fundamental change. For example,
although outside directors are required to make up at least 50 percent of the
boards of directors at listed companies, the actual independence of these
“independent” directors is in doubt.
To promote further improvements in this area, the Ministry of Finance
and Economy established the Committee on Improving Corporate Gover-
nance in March 1999. The committee, which consisted entirely of private-
sector experts, issued a “Code of Best Practices” in September 1999. The
recommendations of this committee, in line with OECD principles for cor-
porate governance, are voluntary. However, the Korea Stock Exchange has
required listed companies to provide information to their shareholders
about the extent to which they conform with the code. Moreover, the eﬀorts
of Jang Hasung, who participated in the OECD Development Center’s
workshop on corporate governance in the spring of 2000, have been well
publicized (as can be seen, e.g., in Hamlin, 2000, Larkin 2000, Lee 1999,
Scott 1998, The Economist 1999). 
An example of improved corporate governance is the refusal of other
chaebol to assist Hyundai Engineering and Construction in spite of the
government’s encouragement, when the company teetered on the edge
of bankruptcy. The other chaebol were afraid of being sued by minority
shareholders.
Conclusion
The Korean case suggests four possible lessons for crisis prevention:
1. Even in a crisis, you can’t import credibility; you have to earn it in do-
mestic market institutions. 
2. There are many exchange rate/convertibility options besides the two-
corner solutions of a currency board and pure float. The exact solution
should recognize that financial freedom interacts with political freedom,
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and therefore that a constituency for capital account openness cannot arise
unless financial supervision is operative. This is developed in Macedo, Co-
hen, and Reisen (2001).
3. Peer-pressure mechanisms are useful to intermediate the process of
earning credibility; this can be facilitated by regional surveillance. In ad-
dition to the worldwide surveillance provided by the IMF and the peer
pressure derived from OECD membership, the mechanism adopted by the
European Union can be helpful. This is evident in the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN3) swaps (also called the Chiang Mai
initiative). The alternative chosen by Taiwan, stressing bilateral rather than
multilateral surveillance mechanisms, implies a high standard (as pointed
out earlier). The caveat about peer pressure suggested by the European ex-
perience, as reviewed in Macedo (2000) and in Macedo, Cohen, and Reisen
(2001), is that entry conditions may not be as eﬀective in earning credibility
as accepted norms would be. This is the diﬀerence between the so-called
Maastricht criteria and the stability pact approved in 1996. In Korea, the
liberalization brought about to qualify for OECD membership was defen-
sive rather than cooperative, so that additional measures must be agreed
upon domestically.
4. A myth concerning “Asian values” has often been contrasted with
supposed Latin American values, when in fact policies and institutions that
are appropriate for one stage of development may not be appropriate for an-
other. This is similar to the comparison made at the outset between Korea
and Sudan at a time when Africa was seen as having greater potential than
Asia. The importance of making comparisons is, of course, that it is an es-
sential prerequisite of peer pressure. The comparison between the Korean
and the Irish model, for example, suggests that domestic taxation and for-
eign investment policies can go a long way toward diﬀerentiating the two
experiences of export promotion, with a clear advantage for Ireland’s
model.
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Discussion Summary
Sebastian Edwards made two comments. First, he expressed his sympathy
with the view that the discussion of crises should focus on economic argu-
ments rather than cultural diﬀerences. He said that, unfortunately, this is
not the trend in the current public debate. The most popular book of the
year 2000 on public policy (according to the New York Times), Culture Mat-
ters, edited by Harrison and Huntington, argues the exact opposite—that
perhaps the only thing that matters is values. Second, he praised the paper
for discussing the historical events that aﬀected the Korea’s present situa-
tion and suggested that the authors add a timetable. He emphasized that the
fact that the United States labeled Korea an exchange manipulator (the
only country ever given that title by the United States) and pushed Korea to
open up its capital account in the late 1980s had a great deal to do with the
currency crisis in 1997. Martin Feldstein later shared this view.
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Joshua Aizenman asked about the welfare eﬀects of opening capital mar-
kets. He said that the eﬀect is ambiguous, because opening up the capital
markets in Korea might have advanced the occurrence of the crisis, but it
also helped to prevent Korea from running into a later crisis with more se-
rious internal problems (like those that occurred in Japan).
Dani Rodrik commented that the paper seemed to support the idea that
Korea had structural problems and therefore it also seemed to support the
IMF program, which emphasized structural reforms and cleaning up the fi-
nancial sector. However, he said that this was contradicted somewhat by the
fact that Korea had recovered very nicely since the crisis and had been do-
ing very well long before any of these policies were implemented. The ques-
tion is how to reconcile the high speed of recovery and argument in favor of
structural reform; one possibility could be that the current growth is a
short-term leap. Rodrik also said that one could have made the same argu-
ment regarding the earlier Korean crisis in the 1980s, which was also pre-
ceded by severe structural problems in the heavy and chemical industries
and a very large current account deficit. Yet Korea not only turned around
in one year, but also had very nice growth rates for another seventeen years
before it was hit by the Asian crisis.
Robert Dekle also commented on the structural problems of Korea and
said that a paper by Yung-Chul Park (1991) found that the heavy and chem-
ical industry policies led to many problems for the commercial banks, and
the Bank of Korea was forced to use policy lending to maintain them.
Charles W. Calomiris said that a recent McKinsey report on Korean
manufacturing argued that the heavy protection through trade policy,
rather than corporate governance, was the cause of the Korean crisis. He
personally disagrees with this view, which, however, seems to be influential.
He suggested that the author refer to and contradict the viewpoint of the re-
port.
John McHale remarked that this paper complemented the paper by
Dekle and Keltzer (presented earlier in the conference) and described a
march toward disaster through domestic credit expansion. He asked if the
authors could discuss the time inconsistency problem in the context of Ko-
rea and provide some explanation why the Korean government could not
make a commitment not to provide guarantees and stop the domestic ex-
pansion.
Simon Johnson pointed out that the paper rightly put corporate struc-
tures and corporate financial relationships at the center of the cause of the
Korean crisis. Second, he commented that the paper was convincing on the
issue of vulnerability, but there was still a question why and how the crisis
happened in 1997. As shown in the paper, the debt-equity ratio was high
and asset returns were negative for a long period of time. He stressed that
domestic investors believed that if individual chaebol did badly, the group as
a whole would bail out that individual company, and that was why investors
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trusted their money to chaebol. What triggered the crisis in 1997 was the col-
lapse of Hanbo and, later, that of the heavily leveraged Daewoo, which un-
derscored the vulnerability of the system. Once people stopped believing
that individual companies could be bailed out, the whole chaebol system
collapsed, resulting in a crisis.
Alejandro M. Werner commented on the data on the currency composi-
tion of assets and liabilities of Korean banks. He said that before the Mex-
ican crisis in 1994, the oﬃcial balance sheet of banks showed very good cur-
rency composition of registered assets and liabilities (because of obligations
imposed by bank regulations), but the oﬀ–balance sheet items were actually
in a much more vulnerable position. His question was to what extent the
oﬃcial balance sheet data could be confirmed by other evidence, and
whether one could be sure that Korean banks really did not have problems
in this respect. Later in the discussion Michael P. Dooley cited his joint pa-
per with Shin in which they found that Korean regulators did watch the ex-
posure of the banking system carefully and there was no anecdotal evidence
of unbalanced exposure.
Feldstein remarked on the paper’s finding that the damage to the Korean
economy through the interest rates was greater than that through the ex-
change rate. He said these findings were important in light of the argument
put forward by the IMF, namely that high interest rates would support the
won and the currency would be adversely aﬀected by the depreciation of the
exchange rate without a corresponding increase in the interest rates. Feldstein
also talked about the issue of exit strategy, that is, how to get out of the gov-
ernment protection of chaebol and individual firms. He said that the problem
of not having an exit strategy was that once it became clear that the economy
had become too big and complex for the government to apply first aid, there
would be a change of expectation, and consequently a crisis would unravel.
On the comment that the structural problem in Korea may not have been
very severe, given its rapid recovery, Jungho Yoo said that the rapid recovery
should be thought of as a “technical rebound.” He said that the huge cut in
investments and drop in consumption after the crisis could not continue
forever. In addition, the large depreciation of the currency had helped ex-
ports to grow, which provided the impetus for the rapid recovery in Korea.
The question is whether the recovery could be sustained for a few years, and
this does not seem to be the case. Anne O. Krueger said that she also found
the conclusion that Korea had successfully recovered to be premature. She
added that the chaebol issue was critical in understanding the cause of the
crisis. For example, she said, chaebol accounted for 17 percent of the Ko-
rean manufacturing output in 1985, a share that increased to 40 percent in
1995 with expanded and diverted credit. This was not only a problem of cor-
porate governance, but also a political problem: these large chaebol were so
powerful that politicians themselves did not know how to handle them.
In response to the question why the crisis happened in 1997, Yoo said the
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following. Up to the mid-1980s, Korean firms were competitive, especially
in the labor-intensive products, but they were beginning to face tough com-
petition from Southeast Asian countries and China. The weakening inter-
national competitiveness did not immediately give rise to noticeable diﬃ-
culties for the firms, however. In the second half of the 1980s, because of
such external factors as substantial realignment of major international cur-
rencies, which depreciated the eﬀective exchange rate of Korean won, and
the huge increase in U.S. imports, Korean firms experienced a surge in for-
eign demand, and the current account registered large surpluses. The fa-
vorable external conditions could not continue to improve, and the firms
began to have serious diﬃculties in the early 1990s. Following the past prac-
tice of helping the corporate sector out of financial trouble, the Bank of Ko-
rea lowered the rediscount rate and the commercial banks their lending
rates. This expansionary monetary policy, together with the semiconductor
boom in the international market, postponed the crisis to the second half of
the 1990s.
On capital account liberalization, Krueger confirmed that there was a
strong fear in Korea of opening up the capital account ahead of time, but
she disagreed with the view that the capital account liberalization had much
to do with either the timing or the magnitude of the crisis. She said that hav-
ing capital controls might have postponed the crisis, but it would not have
led to a very diﬀerent result. On the welfare eﬀect of opening the capital ac-
count, Krueger said that one had to answer two other questions first: that
is, whether the liberalization delayed or had anything to do with the crisis,
and whether crises are good because they imply earlier structural reforms
or bad because they bring huge short-term losses. Because we do not know
much about either of these questions, she said it would not be easy to ad-
dress the welfare eﬀects.
Krueger also discussed issues related to the heavy and chemical indus-
tries in Korea. She said that the promotion of these industries in Korea was
not economically desirable by all measures, and it was the only time that the
Korean government systematically handpicked the industry and told the
investors what to do. Fortunately, Korea spotted the problem quickly and
stopped many projects within a few years.
On the role of excessive government protection, Krueger stressed that the
eﬀect came through the implicit guarantee to chaebol, rather than from the
trade channel. She also said that she and Yoo had checked the Korean data
on banks’ currency exposure and did not find any inconsistency similar to
the Mexican case. 
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